Management Incentive And The Correlation Of Enterprise Operating Performance Research

According to the separation of ownership and management the in modern company system, there is a "principal—agent" relationship between owners and operators. Because of asymmetric information in the market, the owner of a company will face to moral risk and reverse choice of the management, the agency cost exists. The executive compensation has been regarded as a crucial corporate governance mechanism in the west. In recent years, China’s listed companies executives compensation has become the focus of public concern and debate, which also raises concerns for the relationship between the executives pay and firm performance.Based on state-owned enterprise and non-state-owned enterprise perspective differences, for the2007-2010sample of A-share data, the paper research in the relationship between monetary compensation, equity incentive, perk consumption and corporate performance in method of empirical analysis.The study concluded that:monetary compensation has a positive correlation with performance and its relevance in the performance of non-state-owned enterprise is more significant; managerial stake has a positive correlation with performance,and its relevance in the non-state-owned enterprise is more significant; perk consumption level has a negative correlation with corporate performance, and its relevance in the state-owned enterprise is more significant.Through empirical analysis, we found that state-owned enterprise and non-state-owned enterprise, equity ratio, degree of job consumer impact on business performance in the same direction but the extent there are differences, of China’s listed companies to improve incentives to provide empirical evidence. Finally, the corresponding policies and proposals, and pointed out that the innovation of this study and inadequate research, and research prospects.