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Hollowed And Support Related Transactions Of The Controlling Shareholder Behavior Research

Posted on:2012-02-16Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:J L LiuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2249330374989650Subject:Accounting
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
With the purpose of getting a more integrated understanding of the controlling shareholders’motivation of connection transactions in the China listed companies, this paper focuses on analyzing the tunneling and propping activities. In the China listed companies, the connection transactions occur frequently, and closely relate to gain and lose of listed companies, which could result in failure of the governance of listed companies or transfer of benefits among listed companies. Thus, it always is a key and difficult problem in the market supervision and regulation, so it attracts more and more attentions in China.Firstly, the connection transactions and the controlling shareholders’ behaviors of tunneling and propping have been systems analyzed by the transaction cost theory, principal-agent theory, property rights theory and behavioral finance theory, then the statistical analysis of connection transactions in the China listed companies and manufacturing listed companies has been conducted. Next, the causes and ways of tunneling and propping behaviors of controlling shareholders in connection transactions have been discussed. Finally, the data of147manufacture listed companies during2007-2009in China have been taken as samples, and the accounting section of the controlling shareholders has been selected to express tunneling and propping behaviors. Based on the analysis of the descriptive, collinear test and multiple regression analysis, the hypotheses have been tested, and the empirical results clarified and discussed.Based on the above research, the following conclusions have been obtained. Firstly, the occurrence of connection transactions in the China listed companies is prevalent, especially in the manufacture industries, the main types of connection transactions are purchase and sale of goods, guaranty, providing and receiving services, financial transaction and leasing. Secondly, because most of China’s listed companies derive from state-owned enterprises and the legal protection is weak, the main types of connection transactions are likely to become the main ways of shareholders’tunneling and propping behaviors. Thirdly, most controlling shareholders support their listed companies by non-operating activities, and take up capital of their listed companies through daily business activities when they want to act tunneling. Fourthly, through research on controlling shareholders’behaviors on the company’s operations, it has been found that propping behaviors could pose positive influence on the company’s performance, and tunneling behaviors could generate negative influence on the company’s performance. Finally, as the controlling shareholders, non-state-owned enterprises are more likely to tunnel company resources than state-owned enterprises.Although connection transactions usually are considered as a legitimate form, they often involve controlling shareholders’behaviors of tunneling or propping in the China listed companies. This paper suggests that optimizing the equity structures of listed companies, improving the independent director systems and connection transactions information disclosure systems, strengthening the social intermediary supervision, improving the relevant laws and regulations, enhancing government supervision measures should be implemented. The effective containment towards tunneling and propping behaviors of controlling shareholders in connection transactions protects the healthy development of stock market in China.
Keywords/Search Tags:the listed company, controlling shareholder, connectiontransaction, tunneling, propping
PDF Full Text Request
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