Research On The Prevetion Of Farmers’Moral Hazard In Safe Agri-Food Production

In recent years, with the rapid development of economy in our country as well as the rapid rise in people’s living standards, consumers have an increasing demand for agricultural products, which have been certified by the relevant department, and acquired a safety certification logo. As a necessity of people’s daily life, the quality and safety of agricultural products is directly related to people’s physical health. However, as the universal existence of the problem of asymmetrical quality security information between producers and consumers in agricultural product market, the producers may receive the benefit obligation to have the moral hazard, imitating the safe agri-food by the ordinary even inferior agricultural product. Once this kind of moral hazard was detected by the consumers, it would cause the consumers to lose their confidence for safe agri-food, as well as the reversion choice to safe agri-food. Therefore, to promote the healthy development of safe agri-food industry, effective actions must be taken to prevent the occurrence of moral hazard.The reasons of occurrence of farmers’moral hazard include two aspects, intrinsic motive and exterior cause. The former also includes two, pursuing short-term profit maximization and the existence of opportunism behavior tendency. The later then includes three, market malfunction, the limitation of government’s rules and regulations, as well as the low degree and backward management of organization, In the process of prevention of moral hazard, while each has a respective achievement to moral hazard as a main body, market, government, and organization also have a combined action to it because of their relationship.This article has carried on the analysis from macroscopic and the microscopic two stratification planes to producing status of agri-food in Jiangsu province. In macroscopic stratification plane, it carries on the analysis to safe agri-food production’s market environment, the policy environment and the organization environment in Jiangsu province. Concluding that, the overall development of the current safe agri-food production environment in Jiangsu province is better. There has been a good trend showed in the market, policy and organization environment, but still with some factors constraining their development. In microscopic stratification plane, this article analyzes the safe agri-food production situation in Jiangsu province, taking vegetables as an example, including household characteristics, market incentive and constraint status, government incentive and constraint status, organizational incentive and constraint status as well as the actual probability of occurrence of moral hazard. By analyzing the following conclusions can be drawn:Farmers in the research area is mainly40years old to49-year-old middle-aged, with generally low level of education; Family size is mostly3-5persons, most farmers are small-scale cultivation; safe vegetable production in most of the rural household income is as the main source of income; most farmers interviewed sold safe vegetables through distributors, followed by wholesale or retail markets.Taking safe vegetables production in Jiangsu province as an example, this article does an empirical analysis on incentives and constraints influencing farmers’moral hazard in safe agri-food production, and estimates the function direction and the function size to the peasant household moral hazard by the market, the government and organization’s incentives and constraints. Through the empirical analysis, draws following conclusion:the proportion of household income of safe vegetables, the price of safe vegetables relative to the price of common vegetables, farmers growing years of safe vegetables all have an greater impact on farmers’ moral hazard; next is government’s punishment, the peasant household sex, the market examination, the market punishment, government’s inspection and the organization type; once more is organization’s examination and organization’s punishment. To safe vegetables inspection aspect. market testing on the negative impact of moral hazard> government inspection on the negative impact of moral hazard> organization detection on the negative impact of moral hazard. In terms of penalties for illegal production, government penalties on the negative impact of moral hazard> market punishment on the negative impact of moral hazard> organization punishment on the negative effects of moral hazard. Finally, based on the conclusions, from strengthening the drive and striking the restraints two aspects, this article discusses the efficient path that the market, the government, and the organization guard the peasant household moral hazard in safe agri-food production. The measures strengthening the drive include:realizing the high quality and favorable price, enhancing the peasant household income on safe agricultural products, increasing support and subsidies to the market and organization, enhancing the degree of the peasant household organization; perfecting market’s function, enhancing leading ability; enhancing organization’s service function, carrying on the technical guidance to the peasant household from the safe production angle. The measures striking the restraints include:further strengthening the construction of quality detection system in safe agri-food production; further strengthening the law enforcement dynamics.