A Study On The Relationship Among The Quality Of Information Disclosure,Analyst Forecast And Controlling Shareholders' Tunneling Behaviors

The 21 st century is the information age.It can be said that "Who owns the information,who wins." In the capital marke,investors will participate in it,collect information from the market and make their own investment choices.However,due to different identities,investors and listed companies are in an information asymmetry position.In recent years,the Tunnelling behavior in China's stock market has been common and has been deteriorating.Almost every year,China's securities market has a vicious incident in which the controlling shareholder has severely misappropriated and encroached on the funds of listed companies,causing serious damage to the interests of small shareholders.In order to regulate the behavior of listed companies,it is necessary to improve the quality of information disclosure of listed companies.Therefore,this paper starts from the quality of information disclosure,studies its relationship with the controlling shareholder's tunneling behaviors,and introduces the analyst's forecast behavior as a mediator variable to study the influence path of the relationship.The listed companies of Shenzhen A-share SMEs and GEM in 2013-2017 are selected as a research sample,empirically tests the relationship between the quality of information disclosure and the controlling shareholder's tunneling behaviors.On this basis the analyst forecast behavior is introduced as a mediator variable for further research.The empirical results show that the quality of information disclosure is negatively correlated with the controlling shareholder's tunneling behaviors,and the analysts' forecast behavior plays a mediating role.The specific performance is that the quality of information disclosure can increase the number and accuracy of analysts' forecast behavior,and then to the controlling shareholder.In addition,in order to study whether the empirical results of SME board and GEM listed companies are different,also distinguishes the above-mentioned sectors and finds that the empirical results of the two sectors are significant,and the intermediary role of analysts in the GEM is more obvious.The empirical results of show that under the background that China's investor protection system is not perfect,the improvement of the information disclosure quality of listed companies can improve information asymmetry,and enable small and medium shareholders to have a deeper understanding of the operating conditions and financial status of listed companies.The controlling shareholder's tunneling behaviors play a restrictive role;and as an emerging external governance mechanism,analysts have an irreplaceable role in improving information asymmetry.In China's stock market,small and medium-sized enterprises and GEM companies are relatively small in scale,relatively immature in development,and less comprehensive in supervision.There are more problems in information disclosure.Therefore,this paper focuses on small and medium-sized boards and GEM.The company conducts research.According to the research results,this paper proposes to further strengthen the information disclosure system of small and medium-sized board and GEM,improve the quality of information disclosure of listed companies,and effectively improve the information asymmetry between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders.In addition,strengthen the supervision of the analyst industry and enhance the overall quality of analysts,in order to strengthen the role of analysts in information mediation.