Research On The Endogenous Formation Of Coalition Structure In The Patent Race

With the environment of global economic integration, impact on the economy, theinnovation of technology which is growing significantly. In order to win the intensecompetition in the domestic and international, Countries have to build the technologicalinnovation system, which is for the promotion of economic growth pattern. However, theenterprises, universities, research institutes, government research institutions and otherResearch and Development entities usually do this by themselves, and the resources andcapacity of their independent Research and Development is limited. Therefore, manycountries have attached great importance to the theoretical study of the Research andDevelopment cooperation, and actively constructing the various system which canpromoting the Research and Development cooperation. So, how to achieve thedevelopment of competition and cooperation become an important issue which is facinggovernments, businesses and individuals. Cooperation in the competition and cooperationin the competition has been the title of the modern political and economic developmenttrendency.This study is based on the Loury’s memoryless patent race model. Assume some ofthe prior symmetry company competing on a product, technology or process innovation.The probability of the success of innovation is the function of research intensity. The costof the company’s own Research and Development is very high, and the probability ofsuccess is very low. Therefore, companies tend to concentrate its resources, and establishresearch joint ventures. Through establish the coalition to share the burden of the cost, tomaintain a high research input, and the probability of the success of innovation. This paperstudies the coalition structure when these companies endogenous form a similar alliance.Innovation will be analyzed is divided into two areas that is drastic and non-drasticinnovations.1. When the innovation is drastic innovation, due to patent protection, the success ofinnovation of the coalition which can make a monopoly position in the product on themarket. This paper analyzes that the equilibrium structure of the coalition in the drasticinnovation is symmetrical. And it is consistent with effective social structure (the structureof the revenue Maximization, the size of the coalition is related to the economies of scale ofthe coalition. In addition, when the input spillover is present, the balance coalition structuresymmetry, and it is consistent to the effective structure (spillovers is the part of the research of coalition leaked into other coalitions which is involved in the competition).2. When the innovation is non-drastic innovation，the failed coalition is still able toin the market. This paper analyzes that the equilibrium coalition structure is non-symmetricin the non-drastic innovation. It is inconsistent with the social effective structure. When theinnovation is moving to the drastic innovation， the scale of coalition which is first formedwill be increased. Then we bring in the spillover parameter， this article believe that theincreasing of the spillover parameters can reduce the size of the alliance which is firstformed.