| Along with China’s market economy system and tax system’s continuously improving, the cost and risk of enterprise tax evasion behavior becomes larger and larger, so using tax planning for reasonable tax avoidance in order to obtain tax savings becomes a focus of modern enterprise management and financial management. Tax planning can maximize the value of companies and enhance the company’s competitiveness. According to the goal of financial management which is the principle of enterprise value’s maximization, the enterprise should choose the most advantageous tax planning in order to maximize the benefit, but in tax planning process, on one hand enterprises should take the non-tax cost into account and measure it between the tax saving and non-tax cost, on the other hand tax behavior is decided jointly by two control subjects (managers and owners), the game between managers and owners is making the enterprise’s tax planning behavior been mixed with the personal interests of managers or owners. The ownership structure of China’s state-owned listed companies has its special phenomenon, China’s state-owned listed companies generally exist in the phenomenon of state-owned "alone big". At the same time the owner of state-owned universally shares vacancies, causing state-owned listed companies to have the serious phenomenon of internal controlling, and making state-owned listed company senior management personnel to be conducted to choose management behavior for its own interests. Therefore, through researching the relationship of the state-owned listed company’s executive characteristic and tax planning, which having a positive effect in the deeper understanding the relationship of the state-owned listed company’s executive characteristic and tax planning, thus providing theoretical help to promote state-owned listed companies senior management personnel management mechanism and the development of state-owned listed companies from the angle of tax planning. Based on the theory of effective tax planning, principal-agent theory, information asymmetry theory and rational economic man theory system, this paper analyzes the relationship of state-owned listed company executive characteristic and tax planning. Firstly, based on the rational economic man theory, utility theory and A-S tax model, analyzing tax behaviors of state-owned listed companies, then pointing out the tax evasion and illegal behavior in the state-owned listed company act very little, which can be negligible in using account-tax differences to measure the degree of tax planning; secondly, using the theory of effective tax planning as the core, combined with the principal-agent theory, information asymmetry theory system, analyzing the tax planning behavior and its influence factors in the state-owned listed company, then pointing out that the non-tax cost of the state-owned listed company’s executive is higher, compared to private companies the degree of tax planning is weaker; finally, on the basis of above two parts’theoretical analysis, analyzing how the state-owned listed company’s executive characteristic affect company’s tax planning behavior, then pointing out the different background characteristics of the state-owned listed company’s executive non-tax cost existing differences, and tax planning is different.In the foundation of the related theory and index selection, this paper built the statistical model of relationship between state-owned listed company’s executive characteristic and the degree of tax planning. Through empirical research, this paper draws the following conclusions:firstly, China’s state-owned listed companies widespread tax planning behavior, and the tax planning’s degree of the state-owned listed company is obvious difference in the different executive characteristic; secondly, in the state-owned listed company, there is a negative correlation between executives’age and the degree of tax planning, there is a positive correlation between executives’education level and the degree of tax planning, there is a negative correlation between separation or not and the degree of tax planning, but their significance is not clear; thirdly, in the state-owned listed company, there is a significant negative correlation between the executive’s worked years and the degree of tax planning, i.e. executive’s working service life long, company tax planning’s degree is lower; fourthly, in the state-owned listed company, there is a significant positive correlation between pay executives’salary, managerial ownership and the degree of tax planning, but the positive correlation between managerial ownership and the degree of tax planning is more significant than that between executives’salary and the degree of tax planning; fifthly, there is a significant positive correlation between the size of.the company, the company profitability and the degree of tax planning, and there is a significant positive correlation within10%distinct between growth ability and the degree tax planning, but there is a significant negative correlation between the debt tax shield and the degree of tax planning. |