Supply Chain Quality Contact Design Based On Custom Perceived Value

In the new economic development trend, the competition is no longer limited among enterprises, but among supply chains. In the supply chain enterprises need to cooperate with many other enterprises. Usually such cooperation is achieved through a large number of supply chain contracts. In addition to cooperation, there is competition among enterprises in the supply chain. So, the relationship among enterprises is a complex relationship. In order to maintain this relationship, enterprises need an important tool named supply chain contract. Through the supply chain contract’s constraints and incentives, the entire supply chain could achieve the optimization of resources integration and achieve a win-win supply chain.The high-speed economic development and information development in the21st century not only brings opportunities to enterprises, but also require enterprises to gradually improve the quality to meet customer requirements. Quality assurance has become one of the most important conditions for enterprises to gain the initiative in the competition. Therefore, the supply chain contract model based on the parameters of quality is of great significance for describing the quality of resources allocation in enterprise and supply chain. Based on this environment and business needs, the content of this paper is as follows:Through the collation of the literatures, the paper gets the understanding of customer perceived value, analyzes its specific impact on customer demand, and then based on situation of customer perceived value to correct the demand function that is used to expected customer demand based on the price and other factors. Then the new demand function is established.Based on demand function from the customer perceived value, the paper establishes the contract model of quality, the object of which is a simple supply chain that includes a vendor and a supplier. The first part is to build a contract model of quality under the information symmetry. In this case, there is no the bilateral moral hazard between enterprises and the information is observable. Through reasoning, the paper gets the optimal quality prevention level of suppler and quality average level of vendor to obtain the optimal effectiveness of the supply chain. The second part is to build the model under asymmetric information that means there is bilateral moral hazard among enterprise in the supply chain, and part of the information is hidden. This situation is more consistent with the actual situation, and thus this chapter focuses on the analysis under the situation of asymmetric information. Based on model derivation, the paper proofs rationality of fines imposed on quality defect design in the contract, and obtains parameters to ensure optimal efficiency of the supply chain. Combined with a practical example, the paper shows that:in order to improve the quality prevention level, of the supply chain, suppliers will raise median prices of their products to protect their interests, and the vendor will increase the amount of fines imposed on quality defect to ensure the leading position in the supply chain. At the same time, vendor will provide the incentive of supplier. Also, ignoring the customer perceived value will cause overestimation risk of the median prices of products and the amount of fines imposed on suppliers.