Empirical Research Of External Audit Oualitv And Big Shareholders "Tunneling" Behaviors

At present, in China securities market development process appeared a lot of corruptphenomenon, such as insider trading, fraud and so on. One of the most concentrateddiscussions is the big shareholders “Empty” behavior.“Empty” also known as “Tunneling”,it is point to as a manager’s big shareholders through the underground passage transferassets behavior. Big shareholders use their power, through a variety of concealment meanssuch as internal associated business, securities counter-purchase etc, transferring the handsof all kinds of legal or illegal. This behavior has lead to ignoring the consequences, such asrigged the enterprise’s financial information, encroached on the interests of small andmedium shareholders, influencing of the listed company of their own development and thehealthy development of the securities markets. Shareholders’“Tunneling” behavior hasbecome the key problem in China’s stock market.The auditor’s audit as a kind of important exterior governance mechanism should beeffective recognition shareholders’“Tunneling” behavior, according to the bigshareholders’“Tunneling” issued by the severity of the appropriate audit opinions.Expected audit can able to identify whether listed company existing “Tunneling”phenomenon and the “Tunneling” degree? The auditor published what type of the auditopinion? The audit fee and big shareholders’“Tunneling” behavior have what kind ofrelationship?In this paper, according to Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market in2008-2010annualreports for three consecutive years of financial data, the comprehensive outside auditquality influence three aspects: the audit opinion, audit costs and auditor change, using themultiple Logistic regression of empirical method test and analysis of the three bigshareholders’“Tunneling” behavior. Lastly, we stand in company management point ofview, especially the exterior governance view, put forward constructive Suggestions.Based on the positive of result, this paper concluded that the main conclusions are asfollows:(1)Between2008and2010, the audit opinion and big shareholders guarantee“Tunneling” are in the1%confidence level significant positive correlation. Bigshareholders through the guarantee “Tunneling”, receive the standard of the audit opinion.(2) The audit opinions and the big shareholders capital takes up “Tunneling” are notrelated. There is a little company to receive the standard of the audit opinion.(3) In the three years, the audit opinion and the total assets of the natural logarithm are in the1%confidence level a significant negative correlation. That is the size of the listedcompany; the bigger one is not easy to get the non-standard audit opinion.(4) The empirical results show that the audit fee, auditor change and big shareholdersguarantee “Tunneling” had no correlation relationship.