Research On The Influence Of External Audit On The "Tunnling" Behavior Of Large Shareholders

Under the premise of the imperfect development of the capital market today,due to the asymmetry of information and the separation of control and cash flow,New agency problems have emerged: the behavior of large shareholders harming the interests of small and medium-sized investors and listed companies is increasing day by day.There are also such problems in China's listed companies,which seriously affect the normal operation of listed companies' business activities.It encroaches on the interests of small and medium investors and affects the healthy development of the capital market.Enterprises usually ease the management and shareholders by establishing a set of perfect internal governance mechanism-corporate governance mechanism.And the generation of the sum between the investment of the majority shareholder and the minority shareholder Agency conflicts and agency costs.However,the external environment,such as market supervision,Enterprises often set up a set of perfect internal governance mechanism-corporate governance mechanism to ease the management and shareholders,As an important external governance mechanism and supervision mechanism,external audit represents small and medium investors.By issuing a non-standard audit opinion,to some extent,it can restrain the behavior of large shareholders: tunneling.Then,for China's emerging capital market,can external audit effectively identify the major shareholder's "drawing-out" ? "empty" behavior? If so,why are the results of empirical research not consistent among scholars? Some domestic scholars believe that there is a significant positive relationship between external audit and "tunneling" of major shareholders,that is,the more serious the "tunneling" of major shareholders of listed companies,the more likely they are to issue non-standard audit opinions.Some scholars believe that there is a significant negative relationship between external audit and "tunneling" of major shareholders,that is,the more serious the "tunneling" of large shareholders of listed companies,the less likely they will be to issue non-standard audit opinions.However,others think that there is no significant correlation between external audit and "Tunneling" of major shareholders.What is the reason for the difference in the scholars' research results? What kind of enlightenment can this cause give us?This paper will discuss these problems-the relationship between external audit and the "tunneling" behavior of major shareholders.of "tunneling" is lower,the lag of external audit to a certain extent,can inhibit the major shareholder of the "tunneling" behavior.But that the lag phase of audit opinion of "tunneling" behavior inhibited by more than inhibition of lag 2 the audit opinion,more influence " Tunneling ".3)the "tunneling " of major shareholders is negatively correlated with the audit quality of the lagging period at the confidence level of 1%.There is a negative correlation betweenthe audit quality and the quality of audit in 1%.The "tunneling" of the major shareholders of the listed companies employing the international "Big four" audit firms is smaller than that of the non-international "Big four" audit 5.The higher the audit quality,the lower the "tunneling" behavior of the major shareholders.This indicates that the effect of lag audit opinion on the "tunneling" behavior of large shareholders is attenuating,and when it lags behind three periods,The audit opinions no longer have an impact on the " hollowed-out " of big shareholders.(5)The audit quality of big shareholders is not significant after the " hollowed-out " and the lag phase,and the audit opinions are no longer influenced by the " hollowed-out " behavior of big shareholders.Finally,combining theory with empirical results,this paper puts forward the improvement of external audit quality,improving the quality of information disclosure of listed companies,strengthening the supervision of audit,perfecting the relevant legal environment to restrain the " hollowed-out " behavior of big shareholders,and raise the value of the company.