A Research On The Moderation Of Salary Gap Of Joint-stock Enterprises In China

With more and more enterprises choosing joint-stock system as the corporation form, how to motivate the staff in this kind of enterprises has attracted a lot of focus in China. The motivation of compensation gap, as a main form of motivation in companies, directly influences the working passion and enthusiasm of staff, eventually influences the efficiency of the whole corporate. Currently, there are two completely different views on the relationship of compensation gap and the efficiency in the stock enterprise, that is, the Tournament Theory and the Behavior Theory, in which the former one supports that expanding the compensation gap can improve the efficiency in the enterprise, while the latter one insists that the compensation gap has a bad effect on the enterprise efficiency. Moreover, according to the study of the scholars, the two theories have all gained the support of empirical research. Therefore, it seems that the research on the relationship of the compensation gap and the enterprise efficiency falls into a self-contradictory paradox. So doing the research on the relationship of the compensation gap and the enterprise efficiency can not only advance the development of the compensation gap theory, but also provide some guidance and advice for compensation strategy of the enterprise.In this paper, we select the data of A-share listed companies as the total sample, which are listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from2005to2009. Using the method of combining the empirical research and normative research, we analyze the relationship of the compensation gap and enterprise efficiency from the two aspects of the compensation gap between the management team and between the managers and the employees. At the same time, to test whether there are other variables playing the role of polluting the relationship of the compensation gap and the enterprise efficiency, we introduce three variables, which are the ratio of independent directors in the board of directors, the size of the board of supervisors, and managerial stockholding. In addition, we add some control variables to the model in order to improve the effectiveness of the model, such as:the size of the enterprise, debt ratio, ownership concentration, the proportion of state-owned shares, industry and so on.The empirical analysis results show that both the compensation gap between the management team and the compensation gap between the managers and the employees in the enterprise have a significant "inverted U" effect on the enterprise efficiency. From the empirical analysis, we also find that the enhancement of the ratio of independent directors in the board of directors will reduce the positive impact of the compensation gap between management team on the enterprise efficiency; however, expanding the size of the board of supervisors will increase the positive impact of the compensation gap between management team on the enterprise efficiency; and the managerial stockholding has no significant effect on the relationship of the compensation between the managers and the employees in enterprise. Therefore, in order to improve the efficiency of the stock enterprise, we suggest that the enterprise should think over various factors to draw up an appropriate and moderate compensation gap policy, and avoid the compensation gap too large or too small.