A Research On The Signaling Effect Of Chinese SME Board Listed Companies’ Executives Reduction

Compared to ordinary investors, executives of listed companies hold true capitalists listed companies, effective information is relatively accurate grasp about the prospects for the company and industry trends. Signaling theory is that, due to information asymmetry and the market is not fully effective, the executive’s holdings of behavior can be an effective tool to pass inside information to achieve a balance of internal managers and external investors, investors also based on the reaction of the market to determine the condition and quality of the company’s development. Due to the development of China’s securities market is not yet mature, the governance structure of the company is not yet perfect, small board listed company executives holdings behavior study also did not get the full attention of domestic scholars and management departments, small board listed company executives holdings behavior the signaling Effect analysis has certain practical significance.In the signal transmission theory, commissioned the study on the basis of the agency theory and the efficient market theory, the reduction of the stock of small plates executives of listed companies stock behavior as the object of study, the status quo of the reduction behavior of small plates listed company executives and summary of the reasons for, and economic data combined2008-2010small plates listed companies in China, the event study method to analyze the relationship between the executives of listed companies of small plates disclosure of holdings information with stock abnormal yield to study small plates executives less the held signal pass-through effect and robustness test results using the2011data, and ultimately come to the conclusion of this article. The study results show that:1small board listed company executives poor signal pass-through effect of the reduction behavior.2small board listed company executives stock holdings account for the greater the proportion of outstanding shares, the more easily the information transfer becomes holdings of announcements in the future result in negative abnormal returns, and the smaller the proportion of outstanding shares of stock holdings accounted relatively clear.3small plates listed company executives holdings frequency significantly affect the reduction of the pass-through effect of the event signal. Finally, based on the empirical results, how to further standardize the supervision of the reduction behavior of executives of small plates, enhanced signal pass-through effect of the reduction behavior raised some reasonable suggestions.