A Correlation Research Between Executives Shareholding And Operating Performance In The Listed Company Of Medium And Small-sized Market

The correlation between a corporate’s executives shareholding and its operating performance has always been a hot topic in the field of corporate governance. Using different methods, domestic and foreign scholars have completed many studies which aim at finding out the role the executives shareholding plays in operating performance. Due to complex situation, their conclusion are not the same and there’s no consensus about the corralation until now. This article will continue the study and focus on the listed companies of medium and small-sized market in China. On one hand, the executives shareholding rate of these companies is significantly higher than those main borad market companies, which equips the study with feasibility and practical significance. On the other hand, the relevant study is still not sufficient subjecting to its short launching period.This article makes two emperical analysis. The first one tests the interval effects of executives shareholding by using linear regression. In the test two, we complete an empirical analysis on the excess income levels before and after the incentives. The results show that there does exist an N-style interval effects in the executives shareholding of the medium and small-sized companies. However, there was no significant difference in the level of excess income after equity incentive. For those listed companies in the medium and small-sized companies, this article could help them to select a proper executives shareholding rate and equity incentive programs in order to establish a sound corporate governance system, improve the management level and enhance the operational performance.