Research On The Regulation Of Related Party Transactions Of Central Enterprises Holding Listed Companies

With the continuous development of China’s capital market, the deepening of global economic integration and the increasing complexity of the Group’s organizational structure, related party transactions has gradually become the "key protected" area for government regulators. In recent years, empirically, regardless of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) or China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) requires central enterprises "to resolve horizontal competition and to reduce the related party transactions"; in March2011, Shanghai Stock Exchange has promulgated the related party transactions implementations guidance of listed companies in the Shanghai Stock Exchange, specifying provisions on related party transactions and other issues. However, theoretically, the current researches mostly focus on related party transactions with the controlling shareholder, earnings management, corporate governance and related legal study, most of which find that there is more frequent related party transactions, more related party transactions, and more serious expropriation, if a company owns the controlling shareholder; there exists the motivation to manage earnings using related party transactions for corporations; it is imperative to supervise related party transactions from internal governance and external regulation. But central enterprises is the most important force in the capital markets, and related transactions is one of the hot issues of central enterprises holding listed companies, the current researches do not study specifically related trade regulatory issues of the central enterprises holding listed company.In this context—empirically, requiring the central enterprises to reduce related party transactions, but theoretically, did not giving the reasons and means about how to do these, I selected the central enterprises holding listed companies as the research object, using normative and empirical analysis, divided this paper into five parts. First part is the introduction, which includes the background and significance of the topic, research ideas and methods, literature review and comments. The second part is the research base of research on the regulation of related party transactions of central enterprises holding listed companies. Under the base of elaboration and comment on the relevant definitions and theoretical thesis, the paper concludes and comments the system of the current regulatory framework for listed companies. The third part is the supervisory regulations actuality of related party transactions in central enterprises holding listed companies. Using the method of chart analysis, there are three aspects to clarify at the supervisory regulations actuality of related party transactions in central enterprises holding listed companies. The three aspects are as follows:weak supervision, diversity and non-market nature of the pricing of related party transactions, corporate governance imperfections. Part four is the empirical analysis of the regulation of related party transactions of the central enterprises holding listed companies, which solves the problems found by the front analysis. Firstly, the reason of bigger size of the related party transactions of the central enterprises is that the overall government supervision is weak, unable to distinguish between fair and non-fair related party transactions. Secondly, is the regulatory environment the same for the different types of related party transactions in central enterprises holding listed companies, and how about the impact? The result founds that when there is a higher degree of external regulation, the scale of related party transactions do not contribute to the level of related transactions interests transfer; when there is a lower degree of external regulation, the scale of related party transactions will intensify the transfer of the related transactions interests transfer. Thirdly, the equity restriction and external regulation are playing a collaborative role in the inhibition of the magnitude of related party transactions. Part five is countermeasures and suggestions. Based on the foregoing analysis, respectively, this paper will strengthen penalties for violating the regulation of related party transactions, the implementation of the classification regulation of related party transactions by type, standardized the agreements pricing information disclosure of related party transactions and promote diversified equity reform, in order to improve the effectiveness of regulation of related party transactions in our country.This thesis firstly elects listed companies from the CSMAR, whose actual controller is central enterprises or SASAC, next selects central enterprise holding listed companies from the central enterprises concept stock in Wind database. According to the selected results, we will download the annual reports on the Stock Exchange website, and determine whether the company is the research objects or not according to the final controller information disclosure in the annual reports. Next, this thesis will obtain related party transactions data (types of related party transactions, the occurrence of the amount of the transaction object, the transaction price, etc.) from the CSMAR. The empirical content is based on these data. Due to the indirect nature of the data and limited study capacity of the author, so it is not a comprehensive enough research on the regulation of related party transactions of central enterprises holding listed companies, which should to be further studied in the future.