Research On The Relationship Between The Independent Directors And Related Party Transactions

Most of China’s listed companies restructure from the state-owned enterprise,and the phenomenon "due to the dominance of state-owned shares" is still a significant problem. The listed company and the parent company as well as its subsidiaries are related parties, they use non-fair related party transactions whitewash report, inflated profits, transfer of benefits and evade taxes. In recent years, the related party transactions of listed companies have increasingly become a hot issue of concern by the securities market. As a corporate governance mechanism, the system of independent directors is an important function of the supervision related party transactions."Guidance" explicitly pointed out that listed companies should be given the right to the independent directors be informed of material related party transactions, the right of initiative, recognized rights and independent opinion on the right. But in fact, under the supervision of independent directors, non-fair related transactions still exist, whether the independent director system itself or the related party transactions are there a lot of problems, whether the system of independent directors are meet the expectations of the people and play regulatory functions related party transactions? What inadequacies do the system have? we need to solve these problems.Based on the consideration of the problems mentioned above, on the basis of the at home and abroad independent director system of related party transactions regulatory effectiveness, with our own situation, investigating the correlation between theory and empirical. Theory is mainly consists of two parts, one is theoretical analysis of the independent director system; the other is economic analysis of independent directors of the related party transactions, based on the analysis of the principal-agent theory and institutional change perspective, the independent director system is an effective institutional arrangements. Empirical aspects related party transactions in accordance with the different types of areas are divided into four different indicators,In addition to re-join the corporate governance structure and financial indicators as control variables, using SPSS17.0descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables and the explanatory variables, build a multiple linear regression model discriminating whether the independent directors have effect of the different types of related party transactions,and provide guidelines for the identification of related party transactions of listed companies engaged in corrupt conduct. Also we use principal component analysis, several variables with material related party transactions is set to build a comprehensive indicator of material related party transactions, the system of independent directors of listed companies as a whole related party transactions do regression analysis. Empirical analysis the concluded confirmed the supervision of the independent director system is not ideal.