The Impact Of Controlling Shareholders On Information Disclosure Transparency

Since the last century our country securities market has established, marketmaturity rising has become an important place for allocation resources.Information disclosure of listed companies is the basis for stakeholderdecision-making and it conduct stock market to play the resource allocationfunction. After nearly20years of development, regulate the listed companyinformation disclosure in investor protection play a positive role. Therefore, howto improve the information disclosure transparency is an issue of concern togovernments. This paper researches the information disclosure transparency oflisted companies in this context.Private enterprises have become the main source of economic growth. Butthe research evidence shows that most of China’s private listed companies areunder ultimate ownership structure. Ultimate controller control several listedcompanies mainly by pyramid ownership structure. Compared with thestate-owned listed companies, the separation of ultimate control and ownership ofprivate listed companies are more serious, and the intention in order to improvethe transparency are smaller. So the information transparency is less. In addition,the board of directors plays a "connecting link" role in corporate governance andalso largely affect the content and methods of information disclosure. Therefore,this paper researches the influence of ultimate ownership, the separation ofultimate control and ownership and board features on transparency of informationdisclosure from the perspective of the ultimate controller.This article adopts demonstration research method. Firstly, the papersummarizes the research of domestic and foreign scholars in the field. These arethe basis for the following theoretical analysis and empirical test. The flowing partis theoretical analysis. It analyses agency issues from separation of two kinds ofrights and their impact on information disclosure transparency on the basis ofagency theory and signaling theory. The following is the empirical research, thepaper proposes the hypotheses and tests that by empirical research. The paperselectes489private listed companies from A share of Shenshi as the study object.To ensure the stability of the results of empirical research, the paper selectsprivate listed companies whose ultimate voting rights above20%or30%in2010and375private listed companies in2009as the research objects. The results showthat the empirical results are strong stability.The conclusion of empirical research shows that information disclosure transparency is significantly positive related with the ultimate ownership and theproportion of independent directors. Information disclosure transparency issignificantly negative related with over-control and board size. Informationdisclosure transparency is positive related to two part-time job but not significant.The innovation spot of this paper tests the influence of interaction betweenindependent directors and over-control or two part-time job and over-control oninformation disclosure transparency. The result shows that independent directorscould improve information disclosure transparency without over-control. Butwhen there is over-control, independent directors can not offset the negativeimpact of over-control on information disclosure transparency. Similarly, twopart-time job can not play an effective role.