A Study On Restricting Benefit Expropriation Of Controlling Shareholders Based On Debt Structure

Stock concentration of lead to the status of the controlling shareholder of the company stand out, the controlling shareholder of the pursuit of maximizing their own interests led to the interest of controlling shareholders and small shareholders and creditors, the interests of outside investors such as inconsistency. Controlling shareholders of the shares by the share earnings gains and occupation of the interests of external investors, private benefits of two parts, in the pursuit of return on equity in the process of holding the interests of shareholders and outside investors are the same, but in the pursuit of private benefits process, the controlling shareholders and the interests of outside investors on the inconsistency of the. As the company has the absolute or relative control of the controlling shareholder of the company than outside investors of all aspects of Information Learn more comprehensive, while, more power to influence the company’s various business decisions, have control over information superiority and controlling shareholder will not be content to share with outside investors in the same earnings, they will pursue greater benefit motives, but this should not be considered the pursuit of their interests will inevitably lead to the interests of companies and external investors, occupation, foreign investment not only damage the interests, not conducive to the company’s long-term development, and ultimately will also affect the healthy development of capital markets. In order to maintain the balance of interests and the healthy development of the market, constraints, actions to seize the benefits the controlling shareholder is necessary.In the past to seize the benefits of the controlling shareholders of a study noted that by optimizing the company’s ownership structure, organizational structure, and strengthen the legal and market regulation ways can restrain acts of controlling shareholders occupation, but also some academics have suggested controlling shareholder debt financing to seize the benefits of the restraint can play an active role. They believe that creditors of the company to provide the company as operating capital side, the company’s outside investors, in order to ensure that claims are debt service, the controlling shareholder will strengthen supervision to prevent them from making only beneficial to the detriment of their own companies and the behavior of all the interests of investors, which can seize the benefits of holding shareholder constraints play a role in behavior. This view is to study the debt as a whole, however, the debt itself has many forms, different debt have different quality, from the perspective of the debt structure to better reveal the detailed study of the controlling shareholder debt financing interests of the occupation of the binding behavior of the role of what sort of.This sub-structure of three different debt:debt maturity, debt priority structure and debt structure were arranged to study in the LLSV first proposed in2002to seize the benefits the controlling shareholder of the basic analysis model based on the added elements of debt, set up conversion model, obtained by mathematical method to solve three types of debt structure and the controlling shareholders of the correlation between occupation, described the economic implications of two related, conclusion is:the long-term debt maturity structure of debt, debt priority structure of the non-priority debt and debt public debt layout structure to seize the benefits of the controlling shareholders have a stronger binding effect. Then this proposed structure based on three empirical studies of debt assumption, combined with previous studies of the impact of factors, through empirical testing to verify the debt structure and other factors of three controlling shareholders of the occupation of a constraint. Final conclusions drawn from empirical maturity structure of debt in the long-term debt and debt structure of non-priority priority to seize the benefits of debt on the controlling shareholder has significant constraint effect, and the debt structure of the open layout of the controlling shareholders to seize the benefits of debt the restriction of not significant.