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A Study On The Inhibitory Effect Of Managers On The Controlling Shareholders' Expropriation Behavior

Posted on:2017-04-03Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:X W LiuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2359330512474649Subject:Finance
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
In our country,most of the listed company has "a dominant" equity structure characteristics.Due to the largest shareholder in the corporate governance structure of the power and the benefit balance mechanism is not perfect,the controlling shareholders encroach on the interests of the company is often happened,the existence of this phenomenon is serious damage to the rights of the minority shareholders and other stakeholders.Aiming at this problem,scholars at home and abroad respectively controlling shareholders encroach on the form of interest,ownership structure,board characteristics,external audit,internal and external governance mechanism of benefit expropriation behavior of controlling shareholders launched research and the influence of the relatively rich achievements.In the company's internal management system,management and shareholder interests is not exactly the same stakeholders,by their background,restraint and incentive mechanism and its behavioral characteristics,may to a certain extent affect the interests of controlling shareholders encroach on behavior.But,on the one hand,the existing research literature more focus on the corporate governance mechanism for managers of agent behavior constraints,less focus on managers to shareholders the inhibitory effect of self-interest behavior.Even with a small amount of literature,on the other hand,focus on this problem,also did not fully consider management background,constraints and incentive mechanism,and management behavior characteristics of the effects of inhibition of benefit expropriation behavior of controlling shareholders.In view of this,based on the Shenzhen stock exchange in 2013-2015 a-share listed companies as samples,using balance panel data and fixed effects model(FE),empirical research on the management background,salary and benefit expropriation behavior of the largest shareholder equity incentive effects.In this paper,the study found that by professional managers as a CEO or CFO and senior management team of professional managers of high ratio,the higher managers shareholding and pay,can effectively inhibit the controlling shareholders encroach on the interests of behavior;And appointed by the controlling shareholder of the CEO or CFO and controlling shareholders appointed executive higher proportion in the senior management team,the lower managers shareholding and compensation,it is difficult to suppress benefit expropriation behavior of controlling shareholders.Further research also found that in the state-owned listed companies,the controlling shareholder shareholding lower and smaller in the listed companies of listed companies,the effect is more apparent.In theory this article research,to expand the company's internal governance theory in the study of shareholders and managers of mutual checks and balances mechanism,enrich the relevant research literature.In practice,to improve the internal governance mechanisms of listed companies has reference significance.
Keywords/Search Tags:Internal Governance of the Company, Expropriation of Controlling Shareholders, Characteristics of Managers, Capital Occupation
PDF Full Text Request
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