Influential Factors On Top Executive Compensation:empirical Evidence From China’s State-owned Holding Listing Corporation

In recent years, the state-owned listing Corporation executives’ wages have beenconcerned widely in the community, also become the focus of academic research, and thegovernment has also issued a series of restrictions on executive compensation of state-ownedenterprises pay the limit. Whether the limit of the pay can control the executives ofstate-owned enterprises excessively high salary or not, whether the executive compensation isreally linked to enterprise performance, this is the practical significance of the research.Meanwhile, this paper also enriches the theory research on executive compensation, and italso provides the theoretical and practical basis so as to improve the executive compensationincentive effect.In this paper, the salary limit promulgated background, has analyzed the research statusof domestic and foreign scholars on executive pay with principal-agent theory, corporategovernance theory, managerial power theory, human capital theory. First of all,with themethod of descriptive statistics analysis of state-owned listing Corporation executives salarypresent situation, analysis results show that: there are obvious differences between differentregions, different industries and different scale state-owned listing Corporation executivecompensation, executive compensation generally it is increasing, but the maximum isdecreasing year by year, therefore it confirms that the salary limit order has a significantinfluence on the limit of their high salary. The empirical analysis of the main factors inaffecting the state-owned listing Corporation executive compensation, selection of operatingperformance, firm size, capital structure, the size of the board of directors, the locationof thecompany in economic development and the executive power of six indicators as influentialreasons, and the high tube power index is being improved, tenure, equity in selectingexecutives scattered degree, the board chairman and the general manager is two duty syncreticbases, combining with the special nature of the entrusted agency chain is long state-ownedenterprises, joined the index to control the state-owned Pyramid chain depth, thecomprehensive index four index analysis method for the synthesis of executive power byprincipal component in order to more accurately measure the size of the power of executives of state-owned enterprises. The six indexes above are put forward six hypothesis, selected635state-controlled listing Corporation2009-2011three years data, carries on the real diagnosisanalysis, comes to the following conclusion: executive compensation and corporateperformance, company size, area developed degree, executive power significantly positivecorrelation, negative effect on capital structure, and the board of directors is not associatedwith scale. From the empirical results, we can see that in the salary limit order promulgatedbackground, executive compensation and corporate performance has achieved the true senseof the hook. Finally, according to the problems and the results found in the research process,researchers put forward four proposals to enhance executive compensation of state-ownedenterprises incentive effect: improve the salary structure, increase the long-term incentive;improve the appointment system, strengthen the market mechanism; strengthen the boardaccountability, improve enterprise internal control; to improve the disclosure of information,increase the salary transparency.This paper has two innovations: firstly, promulgated the salary limit order backgroundanalysis of influencing factors of executive compensation of state-owned enterprises in thecountry, the research perspective is relatively new; secondly, the improvement in the selectedindicators on the executive power, adding this index to control the state-owned Pyramid chaindepth, so that it can have a better measure of state-owned listing Corporation executivepower.Study on the influencing factor of state-owned listing Corporation executivecompensation, the future research needs to be further improved. It can join the long-termincentive compensation, and consider some standards difficult to quantify but have importanteffects on the salary index, making the research results more accurate.