The Tripartite Stakeholders’ Evolutionary Game Theory Of The Reform Of Villages-in-City Based On System Dynamics

The problem of Villages-in-City first appeared in the late eighties, and then, it has become acommon phenomenon in the process of city development until in the late90’s. The phenomenonof Villages-in-City has appeared because of the rapid development which implies non-reasonableplanning and development of backward. The problem of Villages-in-City becomes so negativethat we should handle it as soon as possible. The common pursuit of the goal to solve theproblem of Villages-in-City is to try to seek development path suitable for Villages-in-Citythrough appropriate means and ways.This paper is divided into five parts. The first part is about the backgrounds, meanings andissues, moreover, the Villages-in-City literatures are reviewed. The second part is the theoreticalbasis-Evolutionary Stable State or Strategy&System Dynamics, and their applicability. Thethird part qualitatively analyzes the focus of the game among the main participants, makes theassumptions and sets factors, analyzes the participants’ income and then through theEvolutionary Game theory to analyze the tripartite game system in the reforming Villages-in-City process. The fourth part simulated analyzes the tripartite stakeholders’ evolutionary gamesystem by System Dynamics theory, besides, find out the evolutionary game equilibrium and thesensitivity of factors on this equilibrium. The fifth part summarizes the conclusion, makessuggestions on Villages-in-City reforming, points out the limitation of this paper and thedirections of further research.