Evolutionary Game Analysis And Simulation With System Dynamics For Behavioral Strategies Of Participants In Crowd Logistics

The rapid development of China's economy and the great enrichment of people's material life have put forward higher requirements for the logistics industry.The crowd logistics model of "Internet + logistics" provides an innovative path for the upgrading of China's logistics industry and has become a hot spot for research.However,as an emerging operation model,crowd logistics still has an unsound and imperfect management mechanism,and the contradiction of interests between participating subjects is particularly prominent,which brings great challenges for the stable development of crowdsourcing logistics platform.In order to analyse the interaction between the participating parties of crowdsourcing logistics and coordinate the conflict of interests among them,this paper combines evolutionary game theory with system dynamics theory,constructs a three-party evolutionary game system dynamics model of the behavioural strategies of the participating parties of crowdsourcing logistics,conducts simulation analysis of the different behavioural strategies of each participating party,and draws relevant conclusions,which provides theoretical guidance for achieving the equilibrium of the interests of the participating parties of crowdsourcing logistics.The model provides theoretical guidance and strategic reference for decision-makers of crowdsourcing logistics enterprises.Firstly,this study analyses the interaction relationship between the participants of crowdsourcing logistics,determines the external parameters and basic assumptions of the evolutionary game model,introduces the replicated dynamic equations,and constructs the static behavioural strategy evolutionary game model and the dynamic behavioural strategy evolutionary game model respectively.The results show that there are three possible stable pure strategy evolutionary equilibrium points in the static behavioural strategy evolutionary game model and one possible stable mixed strategy evolutionary equilibrium point in the dynamic behavioural strategy evolutionary game model;the instability factors of the above equilibrium strategies are analysed and the results show that adjusting the initial assumptions can stabilise the above possible stable evolutionary equilibrium points.Secondly,this study analyses the feasibility and advantages of combining the evolutionary game model with the system dynamics model;on the basis of the established evolutionary game model of the behavioural strategies of the three parties involved in crowdsourcing logistics,the exogenous,intermediate and horizontal variables of the system dynamics model are determined,and the formulae for calculating the interactions between the variables in the system dynamics are prepared according to the evolutionary game model;then the system dynamics model is constructed through Then,the causal loop diagram of the system dynamics model was drawn by Vensim software,and the system dynamics model of the evolutionary game was constructed from the static and dynamic perspectives respectively.Finally,this study collected data related to typical crowdsourcing logistics platforms at home and abroad,based on which the initial values of the evolutionary game system dynamics model were determined and the stability of the evolutionary game system dynamics model for static and dynamic behavioural strategies was simulated and analysed using the simulation software Vensim.The following conclusions are drawn: the static behavioural strategy evolutionary game system dynamics model does not have a stable evolutionary equilibrium,and there is a stable evolutionary equilibrium solution in the dynamic behavioural strategy situation;the probability of the shipper's choice of irregular behaviour is positively related to the additional benefit it obtains through this behaviour;the dynamic penalty is more reasonable,and a higher initial value of penalty has a deterrent effect and can quickly inhibit the shipper's irregular behaviour,and a lower equilibrium penalty value can keep a lower level of the shipper's irregular behaviour.The main purpose of the drivers in crowdsourcing logistics is to obtain revenue,and subsidies are an important way to increase their revenue.A higher initial value of subsidies can increase the attractiveness of the platform,and the elimination of subsidies after equilibrium can reduce the operating costs of the platform.