Limitation Of Language And The World-The Theory Of Saying And Showing And Its Religious Implications

In Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein introduces the theory of saying and showing, maintaining that language sets the limits between what can be said and what cannot be said. The theory of saying and showing not only reflects Wittgenstein’s philosophical thinking about language and the world from the view of the limitation of language and the world, but implies Wittgenstein’s religious concerns and anxiety in doing his philosophy.This thesis lays the emphasis on understanding the theory of saying and showing and attempts to achieve this by examining the limitation of language and the world, which the author of the thesis believes is extremely beneficial in aiding us to understand Wittgenstein’s philosophical thoughts on language and the world, his religious anxiety as well as the probable continuity of Wittgenstein’s early and later writings.There are two commonly recognized stages of Wittgenstein’s thought, his early and his later thought. The early thought is epitomized in his early work Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, and the later thought is mostly reflected in his later work Philosophical Investigations. It is believed that Wittgenstein’s early philosophy is dramatically distinct from his later philosophy in many ways. However, the question has set us thinking whether there is a discontinuity or continuity between his early and his later thought and what there is in Wittgenstein’s works that has made such discontinuity or continuity. The basic point of this thesis is that it is the theory of saying and showing that provides a link between Wittgenstein’s early and later thought in addition to its other fundamentally important philosophical implications in relation to his view of language and the world.To establish its point of view, the thesis gives a literature review about the development of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, his brief biography, both domestic and overseas studies on Wittgenstein’s philosophy, the theory of saying and showing, and so on.Then, emphasis shifts to the investigation of the theory of saying and showing in order to explore the demarcation line that Wittgenstein draws between what can be said and what cannot be said and can only be shown, which is the language limits. Besides, a and what cannot be said and can only be shown, which is the language limits. Besides, a novel understanding "The limits of my language mean the limits of my world"(TLP5.6) is offered to iterate the insight that because of the linguistic nature of understanding, the limitation of language is the limitation of understanding, hence the limitation of the world.Finally, efforts in search of the religious implications of the theory of saying and showing bring about the conclusion that there is, indeed, an interesting and fruitful analogy between Wittgenstein’s philosophy and a "religious point of view" in the light of the hypothesis that Tractatu is divided into seven parts, each of which is analogous to each of the seven days of creation in the Bible, and that the limit the theory of saying and showing sets between what can be said and what can only be shown demonstrates its religious affinity:the power of metaphysical subject in "the limit of my language is the limits of my world" resembles the formidable power of God’s will, which is unassailable and untranscendable.