| My dissertation concerns Wittgenstein's early philosophy. In his view, I argue, philosophical problems are formulated the way they are because philosophers overlook the distinction between sign and symbol, which is of a piece with the distinction between apparent and real logical form. Wittgenstein's response to this predicament is to try to draw a limit to the expression of thought by specifying the logical form he believes all kinds of representation have in common. I stress that because for Wittgenstein reality shares this form--the logical form of the substance of the world--this effort involves him in an attempt to draw a limit to the world as well. By Wittgenstein's own lights, however, this project cannot succeed. In his view, it is impossible to specify the logical forms of the elementary propositions and atomic facts, from which all other propositions and facts are composed. More importantly, however, according to Wittgenstein, because logical form shows itself, one cannot represent it at all. I construct an argument for Wittgenstein's distinction between showing and saying which is rooted in his essentialism. I then turn to his analysis of action. I argue that he believes willing is not the cause of acting, but is identical with it. I argue further that for Wittgenstein willing involves an irreducibly metaphysical element. I go on to explore the possibility that in his view, the willing subject is the substance or limit of the world. Finally, I turn to his analysis of ethical propositions. While initially Wittgenstein appears to be a noncognitivist, from his standpoint noncognitivism is nonsensical. Nor does he accept a straightforward distinction between fact and value. I argue that for Wittgenstein, the source of ethical value lies in the substance of the world, of which all facts are composed. In his view, I maintain, good willing involves a certain way of seeing the world, namely, as a limited whole. But this, I argue, is the perspective he tries to convey in his analysis of logic and language. |
