Effects Of Information Disclosure Quality On New Bank Loan

In China, bank loan is the main source of debt financing.But, in the credit market, there isserious information asymmetry, which affects the efficiency of resource allocation. Informationdisclosure is the bridge connecting enterprises and banks.Creditors hope to get more informationabout enterprises, which can improve the accuracy of lending decisions. Banks loan to companywith high information disclosure quality can be able to guarantee the safety of credit funds andreduce the possibility of bad debts. When there is no access to enterprise information, in order tocontrol risk, the banks will reduce loans to the enterprise. As a result, the enterprise will facevarious constraints. Therefore, improving information disclosure quality makes contributions toenterprises’ credit financing.In this context, the normative and empirical methods is used in the paper,we choose from2006-2010A-share listed companies in the Shenzhen stock exchange as research samples,discuss the influence of information disclosure quality on the new loan and do further analysisunder the specific system background in China. Research conclusions are as follows: First, highquality of information disclosure helps companies get new bank loan. Second, ownership natureweaken the role of disclosure quality of accounting information on loan, that is, informationdisclosure quality has more significant effects on loans of non-state-owned listed companies.Finally, in the high degree of marketization, information disclosure quality affects new loansmore.The results provide new empirical evidence for studying the effect of information disclosurequality on debt covenants under the special system environment in China. They also providecertain reference value for enterprises’ improvement of the information disclosure quality andregulators’ strengthen information disclosure regulation.