Effects Of Information Disclosure Quality On Bank Debt

Information is a particularly important media to link different participants in the capital market. The quality of the information will directly influence whether economic resources could be effectively optimize configuration. High-quality information disclosure can decrease the information asymmetry existed between information suppliers and its outside users, and the disclosure like this can make investors have a deep understanding of the company and make a proper decision. However, there is still some problems revolved with information disclosure in Chinese stock market. For example, a number of companies are lack of enough motivation to offer timely and reliable information to the public, and there is a few companies have already be punished for infringement of the releasing rules.In China, bank loan is the main source of debt financing due to restricted rules of equity financing. Bank would not make reliable predictions about future risks if it is lack of enough enterprise information. Banks probably reduce the amount of loan for to companies because of future uncertainty of credit risk. Oppositely banks are willing to offer their money to companies with high-transparency for safety of the funds. Therefore, offering high-quality information to the public will help the company borrow more from banks.On the foundations of principal-agent theory, asymmetric information theory, information signaling theory, incomplete contracting theory as well as the pecking order theory, a research has made in this paper in how the quality of information disclosure influence the bank loan. Taking the different institutional background into account, particularly under different development of market economy, different government intervention and different development of financial market, the influence perhaps shows differences, so I took these factors in account in this paper.This paper contains six chapters:Chapter I is a brief introduction of the background of this paper, and the reason I choose this issue to make further study. Apart from that, I outline the framework of this article and point out its innovation.In chapter II, relevant prior researches both of Chinese scholars and aboard are reviewed and generalized It contains three main parts:what is the quality of information and how to measure it; literature review of the relationship between the quality of information disclosure and financing from stockholders and creditors; what it is institutional backgrounds, and their impacts on the main issue debated.Chapter III is an introduction of several theories revolved in my studies. In this part, firstly a brief explanation has made first to introduce five theories. Then an analysis of the relationship between quality of information disclosure and loan from different angles has been made based on these theories. Finally, three main hypothesizes has been proposed for empirical study.In chapter IⅣ, I specify my empirical test arrangements. For example, how to choose main variables and their measure ways, and the source of the samples. Apart from that, I design my model for the empirical research on the basis of previous research.Chapter V is the process and results of empirical study. The empirical tests show that, to the listed companies, the quality of information disclosure lead a positive influence to the amount of money from the bank. Comparing with the state-owned companies, this positive influence is more obvious in private companies. It also shows more strongly positive effect in regions with high-level marketing economy development, less intervention from government, advanced financial environment and high-level status of law.In chapter VI, I propose some proposals according to the previous analysis and test results, such as promoting the motivation of companies to make high-level information disclosure, sounding the outside supervision mechanism, promote market-oriented reforms.As for the contributions and innovations of the article, it provides empirical evidence in improving their information disclosure quality to obtain more loan and reduce financing constrain in improving the value of the companies. According to the empirical outcomes taken institutional factors, it calls attention to reduce government invention and complete legislations and regulations.The limits of this paper focus on that the samples all come from Shenzhen Stock Exchange, the results perhaps cannot have a distinguished explanation to all companies. Although the evaluation about information disclosure from Shenzhen Stock Exchange is authorized and widely-used, we cannot get the specific scores of every item measuring the information quality.