The Empirical Studies Of The Relationship Between Ownership Structure And Agency Costs Of Chinese Tourism Listed Corporations

Ownership structure has always been the core issue of the corporate governance. Two kinds of interests violation triggered by the ownship structure have also been the focus of the academe.One is the agency costs existing in the highly dispersed ownership structure,Jensen and Meckling(1976) think that generates because the intersts unconsistent between the operator an shareholders. The other is the agency costs under the concentrated ownership structure, shleifer and vishny(1999) point out the possibility that large shareholders expropriating minority shareholders on the previous achievements. Chinese special system background provides the coexistence of the equity agency costs (the first agency costs) and the agency costs of controlling shareholders (the second agency costs), which makes it possible to study the relationship between the equity structure and the agency costs comprehensively. China’s economy is in the transition process, the reform of monopoly industries are bound to introduce competition mechanism, chinese relevant policy also made it clear to introduce competition mechanism and marketization reform, tourism as a monopolistic competition industry, can offer some reference and enlightenment for reform of china’s corporate governance.This paper is to make research on mechanism and the effect that ownership structure on two types of agency costs respectively and consider the integration of the two kinds of the agency problems based on32china’s tourism listed companies’data from1998to2011. Contributions of this paper as follows:Firms with controlling shareholder have lower agency costs than firms without controlling shareholder; Ownership hold by controlling shareholder is negatively correlated to agency costs; Firms with different identities of controlling shareholder have different agency costs, specially, firms with government as the controlling shareholder have lower agency costs than other firms; For the nature of the board,separation of the CEO and the chairman is helpful to reduce the agency costs,but board size support the agency costs.