The Influence Of Institutional Investors On Agency Costs Of State-owned Listed Companies

With the further reform of the state-owned enterprises(SOEs),the urge to complete the corporate governance mechanisms by bringing the diversified ownership becomes much stronger.The paper tries to investigate the relationship between institutional ownership and the agency costs of SOEs.Furthermore,how will the influences be promoted or restrained by other factors?Based on a sample of all SOEs listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares from 2010 to 2015,the study investigates how the agency costs be influenced by the institutional investor as a whole or separately,The research was expanded from the side of process of marketalization.The robust empirical results shows that:(1)The total shareholding of institutional investors is negatively correlated with agency costs,and the greater the total shareholding of institutional investors,the lower the agency costs.There is a significant positive correlation between the number of institutional investors and agency costs,that is,the more number of institutional investors,the higher the agency costs(2)Independent institutional investors play a significant role in reducing the agency costs of state-owned enterprises,and dependent institutional investors on the agency costs of state-owned enterprises has no obvious reduction(3)The market process can enhance the role of institutional investors,especially independent institutions,in reducing agency costs.