| As with other emerging market countries, in China,highly concentrated ownership structure oflisted companies, the imperfections of the market mechanism and a unsound legal system led to themajor shareholders of listed companies having a very strong motivation to encroach on the interests ofminority shareholders,Johnson used the concept of the "tunnel"to describe the "disgraceful" behavior ofthe major shareholders for the first time.Tunneling not only harm the interests of small investors andcreditors,but also had a negative impact on the financial performance of listed companies,financialmarkets and resource allocation efficiency. Based on the serious economic consequences of the tunnelbehavior of large shareholders,scholars conducted research on how to suppress tunnel from bothinternal and external. Internal governance mechanisms studied mainly from the ownership structure,board characteristics and company characteristics,and external governance mechanisms mainlyconcentrated in the areas of social audit, market environment and legal environmenl,while neglectedthe impact of the debt on it from the point of view of the creditor bank. As the largest creditor,bankshave the advantage of obtaining enterprise information useing lower the cost,and has a strongmotivation and ability in supervision, therefore to research the governance role of debt on largeshareholder tunneling behavior has some theoretical basis. Simultaneously, commercial banks born inthe period of economic transition gradually move towards a market-oriented through a series of reforms,changes in the macro-financial environment will inevitably affect the behavior of micro-enterprise, tostudy the impact of bank debt on the behavior of the micro-enterprise in the environment of China’sfinancial form and test policy effectiveness have a important practical significance.The paper used2001-2010China’s A-share listed companies as samples,we found: Bankborrowings significantly inhibited tunneling behavior of large shareholders, relative to short-termborrowings, stronger governance role of long-term borrowings;Considering the nature of property, thegovernance role of bank borrowings on non-state-owned enterprises is significantly stronger than thestate-owned enterprises;Taking into account our country’s macro-economic environment,at present,China is in a period of economic transition,as an important part of the macro-economicreforms,commercial bank’s market-oriented reforms will inevitably have some impaction on thebehavior of micro-enterprise.Therefore, we analyze the governance role of bank borrowings on thetunnel behavior of the largest shareholder based on financial environment, this paper tested the impactof financial market developments on financial liabilities-bank debt governance role from the twodimensions of space and time. Studies have shown that market-oriented reform of commercial bankseffectively enhance the governance of the bank borrowings for tunneling behavior of largeshareholders;The higher the degree of financial development areas, the stronger governance of the thebank borrowings for the largest shareholder tunnel behavior,and this effect is more evident in thestate-owned enterprises.This is becase the miprovement of the financial environment enhancecommercialization and independence of the bank,and thus effectively improve the relationship betweenbanks in the state-owned enterprises.Between non-state-owned enterprises and banks has always beenreally credit and debt,so the affect of the improvement of the financial environment on the state-ownedenterprises becomes more apparent. |