The Research On SMEs Credit Guarantee Mode In A Perspective Of Game Theory

Medium and small enterprises (SMEs) are important supports for a country. However, thedifficulty of financing restrains them from stable and sustainable development for a long time.As a key method to solve financing difficulty, credit guarantee for SMEs becomes a concern ininternational scope.With the research premise of other researcher’s studies and relative theories, this articletries to explore a method to improve the efficiency of credit guarantee system for SMEs inChina, by comparing the merits and demerits of three existing credit guarantee models, andestablishing game theoretic models, respectively. This article is divided into six chapters:The first chapter introduces the background of credit guarantee system in China, withexplanation of researching purpose and meanings, also it sums up other researchers’ studiesand relative theories. The literature reviewstates the reasons why it is difficult for SMEs tofinance, the rationality and validity of the existance of credit guarantee for SMEs, therationality of credit guarantee model for SMEs by adjusting game analysis as well.Chapter two analyses the characteristics, merits and demerits of Political, Mutual and Commercial Credit Guarantee models for SMEs respectively in detail, based on the situationof our country’s current credit guarantee development. On the basis of the analysis, this articleidentifies each model’s problems and provides the possible solutions, which affords thetheoretical basis for game analysis in following chapters.Chapter three to Chapter five are the main part of this article. Chapter three introduces theestablishment of Political credit guarantee models in two situations, which are rent-seekingexistence and rent-seeking no existence. It concludes the obvious abuse of disturbing ofmarket fairness and increasing of ethical risk by model analysis, suggests the need for politicalguarantee agencies of re-integration in powers and responsibilities, and the furtherestablishment of regulatory system and restriction mechanism; Chapter four provides theMutual Credit Guarantee mode with game theoretical model. It concludes the willingness ofrepaying guaranted loan for value in long run cooperations from SMEs in Mutual CreditGuarantee organizations by analysing single game and repeated games, proves the efficienciesof Mutual Credit Guarantee mode for SMEs; Chapter five discusses the risk level of guaranteeapplying enterprises, establishes Commercial Credit Guarantee mode with game theoreticalmodel, so that to do the equilibrium analysis and the sensitive analysis of equilibrium affectedfactors. It concludes the reasonable range of each affected factor by inputting eligible factbasedsimulated numbers, provides basis for developing Commercial Credit Guaranteeagencies.Chapter six summarises the researches of this article, affords some suggestions to threedifferent kind of credit guarantee models for SMEs. For example, the Commercial CreditGuarantee mode for SMEs should be treated as the main development；The Mutual CreditGuarantee mode should be popularized with efficienct regulatory control and support fromgovernment, while technical support and political support are also necessary; Reducing theleading role of Political Credit Guarantee mode, while providing necessary political guaranteein major industries and regions.