Management Incentives And Corporate Value-Based On The Ultimate Control Person Perspective

According to principal-agent theory, the enterprise shareholder of the company’s managementin order to avoid adverse selection and moral hazard, they will pay and the company’smanagement to enter a contract, to encourage or restrict their management behavior,constraints in the wage contract, in management efforts to improve business performance, byincreasing their salary incentive. In reality, the relative concentration of listed companies,mostly by ultimately control the ultimate controller, the final control of the company’sdecision will lead to eventually control the conflict between personal income sources andmanagement incentive, this will weaken the management incentive effect.This article selects the period2006-2010listed companies in Shanghai and shenzhen a-shareinitial samples using Stata software of measurement, using correlation analysis, regressionanalysis and other quantitative statistical methods, emphasis on monetary compensation andmanagement equity relationship with corporate performance, and according to the ultimateholding the empirical issue of executive compensation contracts effective utilization. Afterchecking the following conclusions:(1) the management motivation, effectively enhance thevalue of the company, namely the monetary remuneration incentives and equity incentiveshave the same effect, is helpful to increase enterprise value. Get higher salary, management,the role of regulatory governance, better management, management and commercial interestsmore consistent, thereby helping to reduce unnecessary cost management opportunism.Relative concentration of listed companies, in this case, the big shareholders and smallshareholders especially serious conflicts of interest. Moderate or equity incentive management,management can promote the effective supervision of large shareholders, to reduce the agencyconflict.(2) can be considered the ultimate controlling shareholder control and company valueis positive correlation between the separation of ownership and management incentiveweakening degree is high, the control of the controlling shareholder’s controlling shareholder,the company to gain control of the earnings of the motivation, the greater the is out of steplead to compensation and benefits management, incentive management of the rewards of thiseffect will be weakened. Especially when a larger separation degree, the weight of theshareholders of the company, to seek their own interest hurt the value of the bigger motivation,it is necessarily management incentive conflicts, in order to increase the value of the company,thereby reducing management incentive effect.(3) the nature of the state of the ultimatecontrolling shareholder of management incentives and positive relationship between corporatevalue, suppression, two rights separation and to promote the match at the same time, thenature of the ultimate controlling shareholder analysis of state-owned enterprises, twoproperties of a conflict between controlling shareholders and management institutions moreserious governance roles of management incentive and binding relationship between strongbacteriostatic action.