Research On Ownership Structure, Accounting Conservatism And Capital Investment Efficiency

China’s capital market system is not perfect, the company does investment in this imperfectenvironment.Companies have widespread inefficient investment because of asymmetricinformation and agency problem,they are overinvestment and underinvestment.Accountingconservatism is one of the characteristics of accounting information quality,and it has governancefunctions.Accounting conservatism is effective in alleviating asymmetric information and agencyproblems, which can improve inefficient investment.One says accounting conservatism requirestimely confirm investment losses, managers don’t radical investment to protect their fame.Otherssay it is adequate and timely disclosure of accounting information,hence it reduces informationasymmetry to remit underinvestment. In recent years the scholars at home and abroad facewidespread non-efficiency investment,for they increasingly concerned about economicconsequence of accounting conservatism.It reflects that accounting conservatism is an importantgovernance mechanism.As Chinese pecial system and marketing background cause ownershipstructure that is only one big share and the absence of owners.While contract parties’agencyproblems and asymmetric information easily lead to inefficient investment.Many scholars believethat ownership structure is a very important internal governance structure of the company.so it caneffect the play of the governance mechanism.This article uses asymmetric information, principal-agent theory and corporate governancetheory as a theoretical support.Drawing on research methods and findings of the related literatureat home and abroad,begin with our unique ownership structure,then analyse what is the impact toaccounting conservatism and the efficiency of capital investment in listed companies.So I expectthat it will provide appropriate policy recommendations for establishing a fully functionalcapital market of China,and also can provide reference for the investors’ investmentdecisions.Through theoretical analysis and empirical research,this article has the followingfinding:1.To improve accounting conservatism can improve the efficiency of capital investment, thatis the case of certain other conditions, accounting conservatism and inefficient capital investmentlevel of over-investment (underinvestment) is negative correlated, accounting conservatism in thecompany’s capital investment has treatment value;2. Accounting conservatism can inhibit overinvestment and remit underinvestment instate-controlled listed companies,but accounting conservatism is weaker in improving inefficientcapital investment in non-state controlled listed companies,especially over-investment;3.Ownership concentration easily leads to inefficient capital investment,and it is significantpositive correlated with the level of investment inefficiency and overinvestment(underinvestment);4.The degree of equity balance is high explains that there is a big pinning force between shareholders,which can improve inefficient capital investment.So the degree of equity balance issignificant negative correlated with the level of investment inefficiency and overinvestment(underinvestment);5.Ownership concentration can inhibit negative relationship between accounting conservatismand inefficient investment level、overinvestment(underinvestment);6.The degree of equity balance can promote negative relationship between accountingconservatism and inefficient investment level、overinvestment(underinvestment);7.In state-controlled listed companies and non-state controlled listed companies,ownershipconcentration plays inhibit role on negative correlation between accounting conservatism andinefficient investment, especially the stronger inhibit role on state-controlled companies’overinvestment and non-state controlled companies’ underinvestment;8.In state-controlled listed companies and non-state controlled listed companies, the degree ofequity balance plays complementary role on negative correlation between accountingconservatism and inefficient investment, especially the stronger complementary role onstate-controlled companies’ overinvestment.