The Relationship Lending Of Micro-enterprises In China

There are a large number of micro-enterprises which are widelydistributed. They occupy a pivotal position in increasing employment andimproving the economic structure in a country’s economic development.Many growth problems are faced in the process of the development ofmicro-enterprises, and financing difficulty is the one that hinders thedevelopment of SMEs including micro-enterprises, and how to help themicro-enterprise make through the financing difficult issues is thecommon concern of the community. Analyzing the feasibility ofmicro-enterprises’ various financing channels is the most importantthing in improving the micro-enterprise’ financing situation. And afterthe discussion, we think relationship lending is way to solve thefinancing problems in this period.This paper can be divided into seven chapters, the first two chaptersis a elaborated conceptual and theoretical foundation. Chapter VII is theconclusion and outlook. The third, fourth, fifth and sixth chapter arethe focused chapters:In Chapter III, China’s micro-enterprise financing condition isdiscussed. Analyzing China’s micro-enterprise financing channels, fromwhich we can make a comparison, and then we can find the one that can betaken advantage of. And relationship lending is an important financingchannel for this stage of micro-enterprises. The status quo and FinancingPredicament is the best reaction of micro-enterprise financing situation.After that, concrete manifestation of financing difficulties and thereason of the financing problems are pointed out.In Chapter IV, the formation of the relationship lending is mainlyintroduced. This is the focus of this article. Based on related theory, this chapter discusses the formation of relationship lending and thenecessity of the formation. The relationship lending play a very importantrole in the bank-enterprise credit cooperation, and the theory just makesit more convincing. The first part of this chapter is to prove theimportant of relationship lending by establishing a theoretical model ofmoral hazard and adverse selection, Then the information asymmetry Gamemodel is used to prove that relationship lending can save the cost of thecredit cooperative. The last part is to introduce the advantages ofrelationship lending after the above theoretical analysis, which is animportant complement of the chapter.Chapter V is the development of the relationship lending. This chaptercan be divided into three parts, the development of the relationshiplending, the comparison of the state-owned commercial banks and small andmedium-sized banks in the micro-enterprise credit and relationshiplending in Zhejiang Province. This analysis tells us the slow developmentof the relationship lending in the current situation of China. The secondpart is a comparison of two different kinds of banks in credit cooperationwith micro-enterprises, and find which one is in the dominant position.The third part we introduce the rapid development of micro-enterprisesin Zhejiang, as well as the development of relationship lending, whichis a good example for our country.Chapter VI is International Experience Relationship Lending andpolicy recommendations. In the first part, we introduce the internationalExperience of relationship lending, using the United States and Japan asthe good examples in development of relational lending experience. Ourcountry is in transition position from a planned economy to a marketeconomy, so the current market presents a dual character. As a typicalrepresentative of the market-oriented financial system andgovernment-led financial system, These two countries has shown differences in the development process of the relationship lending, whichis worth for reference. The second part is the recommendations after theanalysis of the relationship lending in our country, the United Statesand Japan.