The Application And Study Of The Joint Guaranteed Loan In The Small And Micro Enterprises In China

Since the reform and opening up, the importance of small and micro enterprises continue to improve in Chinese national economy, which is the most active forces of the market economy in China. But due to the features of the loan of small and micro enterprise are the small amount, short-term, high-frequency, and a wide range of distribution and so on, commercial banks reluctant to carry out the lending business to small micro-enterprise. In order to improve the current situation of small and micro enterprises financing difficulties, our government issued a series of guidelines, policies to promote the healthy development of small and micro enterprises. Due to the impact of the financial crisis, a large number of banks have been closed down and some larger companies chose financing in the securities market, the volume of business of financial institutions have narrowed. As a result, many financial institutions put the small and micro enterprises’market as a big cake, and they used more widely is the joint guaranteed loans mode. However, the development of the joint guaranteed loans of small and micro enterprises in China also exist some shortcomings:some joint guaranteed groups’members unfamiliar with each other; the default rates of guaranteed loans of small and micro enterprises in some areas are very high, and have a large number of collective default phenomenon; et al. This paper analyzes what’s the benefits could the joint guaranteed loans could bring to the small and micro enterprises and banks, and study the differences between small and micro enterprises and individual farmers in default costs, operating environment, and group identity, has come to carry out the conclusion that in China the small and micro enterprises are more likely to be successful than farmers in the joint guaranteed loan. Using game theory methods to study social punishment mechanism, joint and several liability mechanism, dynamic incentive mechanism which in the joint guaranteed loan mechanism, and study the effect of rise repayments rates bring by the three mechanisms, and the conditions these needed to meet to play a role.That Advantage to the financial institutions formulate reasonable punitive interest rates against to default enterprises, and advantage to the joint guaranteed team formulate reasonable punitive measures to defaulting enterprises. By raising the punitive cost of the defaulted enterprises in the joint guaranteed team, to reduce the effect of loan delinquencies. This paper uses quantitative analysis to study the repayment incentives of the joint guaranteed loans to small and micro enterprises. Put the small and micro enterprises of guaranteed loans as samples, verify the validity of the guaranteed loans’repayment incentives by statistical analysis of the data. Finally, offer several suggestions to promote the development of guaranteed loans business of small and micro enterprises in China around small and micro enterprises, financial institutions, financial regulatory authorities and government departments.