The Study Of The Equity-based Incentive Mechanism For Executives In State-owned Listed Companies

Executives are the subject making contribution to an enterprise which is the fundamentalengine to create enterprise value. Establish a rational incentive and restraint mechanism is animportant way to enhance the enthusiasm and sense of belonging. However, equity incentivemay also bring about such problem that management layers would damage the interests ofminority shareholders through opportunistic behavior. So that, in order to encouragemanagements and avoid risks, not only the research scholars but also the practice managementsconcern about how to build a reasonable equity incentive regime and regulate its implementationprocess.This paper will study the equity incentive situation of listed companies in Chinese ironindustry by consulting some foreign and domestic research achievements. According the studyresult, we are going to deduce how to optimize the equity incentive regime in iron industry listedcompanies. This paper is divided into five parts: chapter one introduces the research background,topic meaning, domestic and foreign research review, research method and technology roadmap,research content and key issues; chapter two illustrates principal-agent theory, idiosyncratichuman capital theory, human capital property theory and equity incentive theory, and establishthe theoretical foundation for later study; chapter three studies the relationship betweenexecutives’ shareholding ratio and corporate performance, and the factors which effect theimplementation of senior executive equity incentive; chapter four puts forward optimizedsuggestions for the listed iron companies equity incentive and improved proposals; chapter fiveconcludes the research result, demonstrate the strengths and weakness in this paper, and makeprospect further study.