An Empirical Analysis On Senior Management Resignation And Share Reduction Based On Equity Incentive Of Listed Companies

Since 2005 our country the Commission launched a series of equity incentives, hoping to enrich enterprise long-term incentives, providing institutional support for the sustainable development of enterprises. After 10 years of development, how does our equity incentive system plays a role, and what is the reason that the implementations of equity incentive executives of listed companies have left and stock holdings? It is our policy makers, corporate decision-making urgently need to know, and these problems are related to the assessment of the implementation of equity incentive effects of norms and future development.Based on the theory and institutional background, through the listed company shares inspiration situation and correlation analysis, we sum up factors that the implementation of equity incentive executives of listed companies leaving and holdings, including executives holding, company valuation, the company’s growth and corporate governance regulatory. According to the assumptions made by, we perform principal component analysis of the company’s growth, the establishment of a new factor index system and regression models, and multiple regression using SPSS and binary logit regression, respectively, for the implementation of equity incentive executives of listed companies holdings and separation empirical analysis. Based on empirical results, we put forward the corresponding conclusions and recommendations. Specific paper is divided into five chapters: first chapter, introduction part mainly summarizes the research background, research methods, ideas and innovation content of the article; second chapter, discusses the relevant institutional background and theoretical basis; the third chapter, study analysis of listed companies equity incentive system implementation and correlation between company size and performance status quo, the study found that equity incentives of listed companies need to improve. And failure analysis are summarized under the equity incentive executives leaving holdings reasons; fourth chapter made specific assumptions, and factors affecting the reduction of executives leaving the empirical analysis, analysis confirmed that executives leave and Save behavior and executives hold shares, the company’s valuation, the company’s growth and corporate governance regulatory and other factors; the fifth chapter, based on empirical results summarized in five conclusions include: the implementation of equity incentive executives of listed companies showed strong turnover the cash motivation; high valuation of listed companies is the direct cause of the reduction behavior of executives leave; the lower the company’s growth, the market is overvalued, holding executives tend to leave reduction, risk-averse; poor Corporate governance will increase the probability of executives leaving holdings; listed companies incentive system and the corresponding regulatory laws and regulations need to be improved. And put forward five-point suggestions: strictly regulate the implementation of equity incentive plan; to improve the pricing mechanism of China’s securities market; strengthen capital market efficiency; improve corporate governance; improve legislative oversight system.