Research On The Corporate Governance Structure Of Valin Group’s

Now, the company occupies an important position in the most important form of business organization in China’s society and economy. In China, public ownership is dominant and diverse forms of ownership develop. The state-owned holding company occupies an important position in the national economy. However, the state-owned enterprises also have lots of problems. By analyzing Valin Group’s corporate governance issues, we propose measures to improve its corporate governance structure, so as to promote Valin Group’s sustained and healthy development.Based on the theories of abroad corporate governance structure, we analyze the Anglo-American model of corporate governance and Japan and Germany model. And, we discuss the particularity and applicability of the various modes, which gives some revelations of China’s corporate governance structure. This article discusses Valin Group’s features of the corporate nature, industrial layout, business model, asset size. Then, we discusses the status of Valin Group’s corporate governance structure of the shareholders’meeting, board of directors, board of supervisors, managers, and other modules. Based on the status of Valin Group’s corporate governance structure, we analyze the structure of internal governance and external governance structure. We find that Shareholder governance dereliction of duty, fuzzy of the function of the Board, the lack of independence of Supervisory Committee, formation of managers and institutional obstacles in Valin Group’s internal governance structure. And, there are some problems of external governance structure, which are the performance of "dominance" in the SASAC, the equity governance level unreasonable and so on.According to the above theoretical analysis and the actual situation of the Valin Group, we propose some methods about improving Valin Group’s corporate governance structure. We put forward some suggestions of improving the working mechanism of the Board, introducing independent directors, establishing some professional committees, establishing supervisory board system and strengthening the oversight function of the board of supervisors, hiring managers from markets and executives incentives. Finally, we summarize the main conclusions of this paper, then, we discuss the defects and deficiencies of the research, and the outlook of future research.