Game Theory Of "Enterprise+Peasant Household" Contract Stability And The Distribution Of Benefits

Since the1990s,our country attaches great importance to agricultural industrialization management. Agricultural industrialization can effectively solve the contradiction between the small farmers and big market, improve the economic efficiency of agriculture and promote rural economic development. In the process of agricultural industrialization in China, the "Enterprise+peasant household" model as the most important agricultural organization pattern encounter the outstanding issues of low order compliance rates and widespread default phenomenon problems, highlighting the imbalance and fragile interests relationship between enterprise and farmers of contract farming and even interests chain rupture, which seriously restrict the development of agricultural industrialization process."Enterprise+peasant household" model whether it can maintain the stability of the contract, the root lies in the reasonable distribution of interests between enterprises and farmers.So the research of contract stability and distribution of interests between enterprises and farmers have important theoretical and realistic significance for the development of agricultural industrialization in China.This study selected the "enterprise+peasant household" pattern in the process of agricultural industrialization organization mode, It is the most important mode of the industrialization of agriculture in China, currently Chinese agricultural is in this model.To some extent,this model realizes the steady development of agriculture and the steady growth of farmers’ income.however it has its natural weakness. The foremost reason of high default rate between enterprises and farmers lies in the uneven distribution of interests.Through the game analysis, this thesis researched the root cause of high default rate and profit distribution in the various stakeholders.Policy proposals are given to improve the stability of "enterprise+peasant household" organization mode and promote the development of agricultural industrialization in China. In this thesis, the content of the research is mainly divided into five parts:Chapter1is the introduction. Mainly includes the research background, research meaning and purpose, research method and technical route, the research trend of domestic and abroad, and summarizes the innovation and deficiency of this study.Chapter2makes clear concept definition.,for example leading enterprises, peasant household, incomplete contract, interests distribution and channel power.These will be as the theoretical basis of this study and lay the foundation for later analysis.This chapter introduces the overseas agricultural cooperation pattern and the domestic "enterprise+peasant household" mode.Chapter3is stability analysis of’enterprise+peasant household" contract. First the author gives a empirical research between enterprise and peasant household. The game explains why the contract is not stable mainly from the situation of fixed price, increasing the penalty, considering the social capital and project social capital.Then from the angle of incomplete contract and compliance obstacles,the author discussed the status of asymmetry, ripped off and asset specificity, opportunistic behavior, exempt from liability clause, specification of the cost of the terms of the contract, the court execution difficulties, organization and system defect,which are the important causes of the high default rate.Chapter4is the game research of "enterprise+peasant households" interests allocation. There are a number of reasons for instability contract between the enterprise and the peasant household.But the most important reason is the imbalance profit distribution between enterprises and peasant households, They do not form a community of "benefit-sharing, risk-sharing". Balanced distribution interests of all parties plays an important role in promoting the development of agricultural industrialization.This chapter uses the Shapley value method to research distribution of benefits between the two economic subject,which is an innovative point of this study.Chapter5is improvement suggestion of "enterprise+peasant household" contract model stability.Mainly from several aspects such as the regulation of incomplete contract, increasing penalty,long-term cooperation,external support,and improving the mechanism for distribution of interests to improve the stability of the contract between the enterprise and peasant households.Chapter6is the conclusion of this article.