A Study On The Relation Between Corporate Governance And The Transparency Of Information Disclosure In Listed Companies

Stock market is the core part of the capital markets, and the premise for its effective operation is the effective Information disclosure, because only the transparent stock market can development healthily. However, several cases of false statement in recent years, repeatedly reminds us, China’s stock market, with lots of problems about information disclosure,is not transparent yet.The issue how to improve the transparency of information disclosure in China’s stock market, has been plagued by the academic circles of our country. Although the Chinese government also attaches great importance to this issue, by launching a series of laws and regulations on the information disclosure of listing Corporation, in fact these measures bring in little success.The materialist dialectics tells us, the internal factors are the fundamental basis for the development and change of things, play a decisive role. So the logic of this article is, to solve the problem of information disclosure of listed companies in China, we must start from the corporate governance mechanism itself. There are many acknowledged defects in our listing Corporation’s corporate governance mechanism. To figure out which defects would greatly affect the transparency of information disclosure, is the key to improve the transparency of information disclosure in China’s stock market. In view of this, by using the methods of normative analysis and empirical research, this paper is researching on relationship between corporate governance and information disclosure. The paper is divided into seven parts.The main research conclusions of this paper are:(1) There is a significant positive correlation between the shareholding proportion of majority shareholder, managerial stockholding level, number of directors and transparency of information disclosure.(2) There is a significant negative correlation between the proportion of tradable shares, degree of two-duty unity and transparency of information disclosure.(3) The proportion of state-owned shares, the proportion of independent directors, and number of supervisors will influence transparency of information disclosure, but it’s not significant.(4)In addition, four control variables, including audit opinion, scale of the enterprises, liabilities ratio, and the performance of the company, have a significant influence on the transparency of information disclosure.Based on the above conclusions, the policy proposals of this paper are as follows:(1) In term of ownership structure, we should rationally treat and consolidate the achievements of equity division reform, and we should properly maintain the ownership concentration before the supporting mechanism is improved. In addition, we should raise the managerial stockholding level, and improve the incentive and restraint mechanisms for operators.(2) To improve the structure of the board of directors, we should focus on strengthening the role of the independent director. Specifically, we should regulate the appointment mechanisms of independent directors, and improve the incentive and restraint mechanisms for the independent director.(3) By building independent supervisor system, regulating the appointment mechanisms of supervisor, and defining and strengthening the role of supervisors, we should further build the board of supervisors, force it to play an effective oversight role.Most empirical hypothesis proposed in this paper is validated, reflecting that the empirical model designed in this paper is appropriate, and the empirical research has reached the expected. However, because of the limited time and capability, this paper also has some defects, mainly including the selection of variables and the collection of data. Of course, this also provides space and direction for future research.