An Empirical Study On The Impact Of Corporate Governance Structure On Accounting Transparency

In the1990s, SEC first put forward the concept of accounting transparency.Since then accounting transparency become a hot research field which scholars athome and abroad focused on gradually. Especially since the21st century, people arein an era of information explosion because of the economic development by leapsand bounds and the changing information technology everyday. Many enterprisesrelease a great deal of information via many news media such as the internet. Usersof information are valuing the quality of information more and more when they arepursuing the quantity of it. But under the current situation, the accountingtransparency of our security market is not high. The fraud of the listed company’sinformation happen constantly and it blocks the healthy development of the capitalmarket heavily. How to improve our country’s accounting transparency troubled thetheory and the practice field all the time. It is a practical problem which need tosolve urgently and it has very important practical meaning. Since the global financialcrisis broke up in2008, to improve the accounting transparency has become one ofthe important measures to better the financial market environment. However, one ofthe important reasons that cause the low accounting transparency of our country isthe imperfect corporate governance structure.The main purpose of this paper is to study the influence of the corporategovernance structure on our county’s accounting transparency, then reveal how toimprove accounting transparency from the point of the corporate governance. In this way, we can have definite object in solving the problem. We firstly carries on theoryanalysis concerning the principal-agent theory and signaling theory and then take aempirical test on the basis of it. We chose2186records of A shares of listingcorporation on the main market as the research sample which released their appraisalresults of information disclosure on the website of the ShenZhen Stock Exchangefrom2009to2013. We put forward hypothesis from the aspects of the ownershipstructure, the characteristic of board of directors and the characteristic of board ofsupervisors. And we select ownership concentration, the proportion of managementshareholding, the nature of stock rights, the presence of foreign shares, the scale ofthe board of directors, the dual role as the chairman of the board of directors and thegeneral manager, the scale of the board of the supervisors and the diligent degree ofthe board of the supervisors as the research variables of this paper. Then we carry ondescriptive statistics, correlation analysis, independent samples test and binarylogistic regression analysis respectively.The final results shows that the number of appraisal results which are excellentand good go upward from2009to2013while the number of appraisal results whichare qualified and unqualified go downward. Although the two trends both change alittle, we can still see that accounting transparency in recent years has been slowlyimproved. But accounting transparency remains not high because the majority ofappraisal results are qualified but not excellent. There is a significant positivecorrelation between our listed company’s ownership concentration and theaccounting transparency; senior management ownership has no significant effect onaccounting transparency; state-owned enterprises have much higher accountingtransparency than that not state-owned; the accounting transparency of thecorporation that doesn’t contain foreign shares is significantly lower than that of thecorporation contains; there is a significant positive correlation between the scale ofthe board of directors and the accounting transparency; the dual role as the chairman of the board of directors and the general manager will significantly low theaccounting transparency; there is a significant positive correlation between the scaleof the board of the supervisors and the accounting transparency; but there is anegative correlation between the number of meetings of the board of supervisors andthe accounting transparency, it is inconsistent with the expected hypothesis.