Board Characteristics、Ultimate Controlling Shareholder And Illegal Information Disclosure

Since the reform and opening up of China, our country developed rapidly in every aspect. The capital market started from scratch and now has become an important part of our socialist market economy. Information disclosure has a very important effect on the capital market and plays an important role in capital market theoretically and practically. In2012, the stocks market in our encounters a great downturn in our country. It is in urgent need of boosting investors’confidences. But endless information disclosure violations bring investors to the brink of collapse, which has seriously affected the development of capital market in our country.Government departments and academia have been looking for effective methods to reduce and manage information disclosure of listed companies. This paper argues that disclosure violations happens a lot because of imperfect ion of i administration structure. Board is very important in solving the problem of agency, it is the core of modern enterprise system and corporate governance structure, and it plays a very important role in the information disclosure behavior. The board of listed company has the responsibility of looking after the shareholders’interests and stopping information disclosure behavior. It is the first line to suppress Information disclosure irregularities. In addition, our country’s socialist market economy are public ownership as the main body, other ownership coexist, most listed companies has transformed from state-owned enterprises after shareholding reform.its ultimate control person from government agencies may come from the central level or the local level. Different ownership and different administrative levels of the ultimate control have different behavior characteristics, and also have different effects in listed companies’disclosure behavior.In the context of special national conditions in our country, a deep research in the relationship between board characteristics, ultimate control person and listed companies’information disclosure violations is very important in strengthening the protection of investors, improving capital market’s voluntary allocation efficiency, bettering management structure, and improving capital market development. This paper is divided into six chapters:In Chapter1we firstly introduce the research background and significance, then we expound the research ideas and the research methods, lastly we introduce the innovation.In Chapter2we firstly summarize the related literature at home and abroad, then we point out the disadvantages of the present study.In Chapter3, based on agency theory and asymmetric information theory, we explain the influence of the characteristics of the board of directors and ultimate control shareholder on information disclosure.In Chapter4, according to the theoretical analysis, we present the research hypothesis, and introduce the sample selection and matching process, then we define the variables and build the logistic regression model.In Chapter5, we firstly use univariate analysis, then we do the empirical test based on the regression model and analyze the empirical conclusions.In Chapter6, According to the theoretical analysis and the research conclusion, we give some policy suggestions of governing information disclosure violations in our country, and expounds the deficiency of this study.In this paper, the main conclusions are:(1) when the number of the board is7-9, the board can effectively restrain the information disclosure irregularities.(2) independent directors of the listed company did not play a significant inhibitory effect on information disclosure violations.(3) whether the chairman and CEO is the same person or not, the probability of information disclosure irregularities is no significant difference.(4) whether the audit committee is set up or not, the probability of information disclosure irregularities is no significant difference.(5) the board meeting frequency and the probability of the listed company information disclosure violations is significantly positive correlation.(6)there was no significant correlation between board shareholding and the listed company information disclosure irregularities.(7) when ultimately control sharehloder is the government, especially the central government, the probability of corporate information disclosure violations is small.(8) there was no significant correlation between the ultimately control sharehloder’s holding way and the information disclosure violations. The innovation is:(1)the existing research on the relation between board characteristics and information disclosure violations almost have no consideration on the shareholding of board of directors. This paper considers the shareholding of board, wihch enrich the literature.(2) In existing literature, the ultimate control person is only divided into state-owned and non-state-owned. In this paper, the ultimate control person which is goverment will be further divided into the central government and the local government. We found that when the ultimate control of listed companies is the government, especially the central government, the probability of the corporate information disclosure violations is small.