Research On Spillover Effect Of Information Disclosure Violations On Chain Directors

Under the market economy system,regulatory agencies play an important role in the securities markets of various countries.In our country,the Securities Law clearly stipulates the power of the CSRC to supervise the securities market.Among them,supervising the information disclosure behavior of market subjects,announcing and punishing information disclosure violations as an important part of their regulatory functions play an important role in maintaining the order of securities market transactions and urging listed companies to abide by relevant laws and regulations.In recent years,with the development and maturity of the Internet and new social media,and the rapid increase in the speed of information circulation,academic and practical circles have begun to put isolated companies into directors' networks to think about issues.This paper not only studies the impact of the securities market regulatory agencies' announcement of information disclosure violations on the offending companies themselves,but also further analyzes the spillover effect of information disclosure violation announcements on other enterprises as public information in the securities market under the director network.In view of this,this article will take the director network as the research angle of view to study the existence and influence factors of spillover effect of information disclosure violation announcement of securities market regulators on chain director companies.This paper based on the signal transmission theory,principal-agent theory,attribution theory and social learning theory,combined with the research results of existing literature to build an analysis framework.This paper studies and analyzes whether there is spillover effect of information disclosure violation announcement on chain director companies under the director network,and the performance of this spillover effect in analysts' prediction of corrective actions and improvement of information disclosure quality of chain director companies.In addition,by analyzing the influencing factors of spillover effect,this paper expounds the important significance of improving the internal control quality of chain director companies to weaken the adverse effect of spillover effect and strengthen the favorable effect of spillover effect.Secondly,according to the theoretical analysis and research design scheme,this paper selects China's non-financial and non-first year IPO A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2017 as research samples,and establishes a market model and a multiple linear regression model.The research results show that the announcement of information disclosure violation will not only produce adverse spillover effect,but also produce favorable spillover effect.The specific performance is that after the announcement of information disclosure violation,the market value of the chain director company will drop significantly,and the securities analyst will adjust the earnings forecast data of the chain director company downward.On the other hand,research data show that chain director companies will learn lessons from offending companies and improve the quality of information disclosure in the future.In addition,this study found that chain directors companies with higher internal control quality can better resist the adverse effects of the above spillover effects and reduce the decline in market value.However,it is necessary to effectively exert the beneficial influence of spillover effect and improve the quality of information disclosure in the future more actively.Finally,this paper analyzes and discusses the empirical results,and puts forward corresponding policy recommendations for chain directors,companies and securities market regulators respectively,which has important implications for chain directors to attach importance to professional reputation,chain directors to improve the quality of information disclosure,and securities market regulators to improve the supervision of information disclosure.