The Research On The Relationship Of The Quality Of Accounting Information And Corporate Inefficient Investment

MM theory, in the perfect capital market, the investment decisions depend on the NPV of the project; However, in the real world, due to asymmetric information and agency problems generated non-efficiency investments. High quality of accounting information can effectively inhibit the inefficiency of investment.On one hand, the high quality of accounting information through information delivery role to play in the capital markets, reducing insufficient investment due to information asymmetry; On the other hand, the quality of accounting information by layers of oversight of corporate governance, the restraining effect to mitigate conflict led to excessive investment. However, China’s capital market, the shares of listed companies is highly concentrated, Company common controlling shareholder, is particularly evident due to agency problems generated by the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders in listed companies in China. Dose this ownership structure affect the quality of accounting information governance effects of inefficient investment?To further investigate how the ownership structure affects the quality of accounting information governance. This paper adopted the3210observation value of the Shanghai and Shenzhen listed companies from2008-2010as the research objection. First, referring to the large number of domestic and international literature related quality of accounting information and Inefficient Investment, Combined with special ownership structure of listed companies in China, the paper analyzed the impact of the shareholding structure of listed companies on the governance effect of accounting information quality on the inefficiency of investment. On this basis, the paper empirically test the nature of the controlling shareholders, ownership concentration of agency problem affecting the quality of accounting information governance role. The results show that:(1) Widespread inefficient investment behavior of listed companies in our country, Among them, the underinvestment due to funding constraints more serious;(2)in China’s listed companies, the quality of accounting information, the efficiency of the company’s non-investment has a significant inhibitory effect;(3) but the increase in the proportion of the state holding and controlling shareholders weakened the governance effect. The innovation of this paper lies in the special equity structure of listed companies in our country, the paper studies the governance effect of accounting information quality on the inefficiency of investment the quality of accounting information on the inefficiency of investment from the perspective of equity structure, the more in-depth analysis to the patterns and mechanism of the governance efficiency of listed companies accounting information on the inefficiency of investment.