The Empirical Research Of Accounting Information Quality On Investment Efficiency From The Perspective Of Equity Structure

With the rapid development of China’s economy,the market competition is increasingly fierce both at home and abroad.Investment,as the driving force behind the growth of the company,is an important way to create a company’s cash flow.Its efficiency affects the current survival and future development of the enterprises.However,due to the problems of principal-agent issues and information asymmetry,most listed companies in China face the problem of low investment efficiency.Ownership structure reflects corporate governance structure.Different ownership structure will affect the quality of accounting information and investment efficiency,and also affect the governance role of accounting information quality.Based on the principal-agent theory and the information asymmetry theory,this paper analyzes the influence of the quality of listed companies’ accounting information on investment efficiency,and the influence of the quality of accounting information on investment efficiency from the perspective of equity structure.Through the construction of a model,a series of descriptive statistics,correlation analysis,regression analysis,and other empirical researches were conducted using 3,969 data of 1,323 companies listed on manufacturing industry from 2014 to 2016.The empirical analysis is as follows:(1)The lack of investment of Listed Companies in China is more common,the degree of overinvestment is more serious,and the quality of accounting information varies greatly from different companies.(2)The higher the quality of accounting information,the lower the investment and the over-investment.This shows that the improvement of the quality of accounting information can effectively restrain the excessive investment and alleviate the problem of insufficient investment.(3)Different ownership structure will affect the quality of accounting information governance.Specifically,when the ultimate controller is state-owned,the quality of accounting information has a stronger effect on the management of underinvestment,and the quality of accounting information has a weaker effect on underinvestment.Equity concentration has a significant negative effect on the negative correlation between the quality of accounting information and the lack of investment.The degree of equity concentration itself does not have a significant impact on investment efficiency,but with the concentration of equity,it will weaken the quality of accounting information on the role of inadequate governance of investment.