Research Of Vertical Collusion Behavior And Prevention Mechanism Of Project Bidding Agency

As the bidding system is promoted in the field of engineering construction, in the case that social division of labor is increasingly elaborate under the socialist market economic system, project bidding agency arises at the historic moment, and gradually become the main part of today’s construction market. However, as information is asymmetric, and profit is not consistent, the auction agency’s violation of professional ethics such as conspiring to collusion behavior in the process of construction project bidding, which seriously violates the fair principles of bidding, hinders economic benefit of project construction quality and investment, and has a negative effect on the healthy development of construction industry.Aiming at the phenomenon that the auction agency corrupting with any bidder in project bidding, this paper established the sealed bidding model and analyzed the impact of the collusion behavior and the corresponding prevention governance mechanism after combing the vertical collusion between the auction agency and the bidder. This is the main work of this paper:1. Analyzed the research status and abroad, and combed the vertical collusion between the auction agency and the bidder, then discussed the main reasons and harms of the collusion behavior.2. In allusion to the common phenomenon that the auction agency helps one of the bidders to change his bidding information after knowing the bidding information of others in the project bidding which takes the lowest price evaluation method, established the bidding models both when collusion behavior exist and does not exist, solved the bidders’bid quotation and each parties’expected profit in the two cases, and analyzed the influence of collusion to bidding strategy, each parties’profit, the resources allocation efficiency and the whole social wealth. After that, with the discussing of the collusion deal, incentive and supervisory mechanism, this paper studied the influence factors of the auction agency’s behavior.3. For the phenomenon that the auction agency helps the bidder to forme around the league, established the mathematical model, and analyzed the bidder’s tender offer strategy and expected return when there exist conspiracy, discussed how the size of collusion alliance effect the agency’s income. What’s more, this article also studied the optimal standard of collusion alliance size.4. From the perspective of perfecting the laws, optimizing the bidding process, strengthening incentive and supervision, perfecting the credit mechanism and advocating electronic bidding, this paper set up a mechanism to prevent the vertical collusion in project bidding.This research has a certain theoretical and practical significance to help to understand the collusion behavior between the corrupt agency and the bidder, develop the restraint mechanism in the field of project bidding, protect the profits of the owner and other participants of bidding activity, and even promote the development of construction market.