Research On The Environmental Pollution Compensation Standards From The Perspective Of Game Theory

In recent years, the environmental pollution problems present blowout type outbreak and ecological environment deterioration has become the bottleneck for the sustainable development of society. This paper based on the previous quantitative standard of compensation for environmental pollution research, respectively, evaluates the highest pollution compensation standard that sewage entity is willing to pay for, and evaluates the lowest pollution compensation standard that victimization entity is willing to accept, and then uses the two as the upper limit and lower limit of the standard of compensation for environmental pollution. From the perspective of bargaining game, we build a non-cooperative game model with incomplete information for environmental pollution compensation, and then make an empirical study on the game of environmental pollution standard in China’s industries, and identify loss amount from 2004 to 2013 decade that heavy pollution industries need to compensate for non-heavy pollution industries through the environment cost measurement method.Research shows that sewage and victimization entities in essentially share the big cake-the balance of the upper and lower limits of compensation, but each share of the cake depends on both sides of the discount factor and a reasonable estimate of the lower limit of compensation from sewage entity. The pollution degree of heavy pollution industries from heavy to light are, in order, petrochemical plastics industry, mining industry, metal and nonmetal industry, light industry, textile and leather industry, pharmaceutical manufacturing industry, electric power industry. The total amount of compensation that the seven heavy pollution industries pay the six non-heavy pollution industries increases from 5121.076 billion yuan to 6104.322 billion yuan via game, an increase 983.246 billion yuan, an increase of 19.20 percent. The compensation standard sets up upon democratic negotiation can improve the fairness and efficiency of resource allocation, consider the interests of polluter and victor and achieve a win-win situation. Meanwhile, the timely introduction of game assistance mechanism, such as certified environmental accountants’ audit and the government departments’ supervision, can avoid the distortion of compensation and improving the environmental compensation rules of the game can institutionalize and marketize the operation of environmental compensation.