Game Theory Study On Stakeholders Of Water Environment Protection In Taihu Lake Basin

Protection of Taihu Lake Basin is always a hot topic in academia, while, few researches on the conflict of interest in environmental protection from the perspective of stakeholders had ever been conducted. The enthusiasm of stakeholders has a direct effect critical role on the implementation of protecting the Taihu Lake. Under the background of lacking policy and system, multifaceted resistance needed to be overcome to coordinate multi-stakeholder. To protect the Water environment in Taihu Lake Basin to form the interest Coordinating Mechanism of Water Environment Protection in Taihu Lake Basin, improving the policy and institutional support together with coordinating the conflict of multi-stakeholders are both important.In this article, we use the Stakeholder Theory to analyse the stakeholders, their interest demands and behavioral characteristics in the protection of Taihu Lake Basin, choosing the central and local governments, enterprises and the public related as the objects, to find out the interest demands and characteristics among the stakeholders and to combine their benefit-based relationships. Different stakeholders involved in the Taihu Lake water environmental protection have different demands of interest. Among them, the central government would like to pursue the maximization of social welfare, including stable production and living, to increase people’s income, to protect the environment and so on; the target of local governments may be to maximize local interests, and to ensure the pursuit of political achievements; the enterprises here are the main polluters in Taihu water environmental protection, who are the "economic man", pursuing to maximize their own market interests, the pursuit of maximum profit is the best interest in their sought. The public, as the most direct victims’ beneficiaries of the Taihu water environmental protection, also appeared to have interest differentiation, for the maximization of individual pursuits and personal gain. Therefore, when the conflict caused by all stakeholders’ pursuit of interests appears, the conflict of different interest demands will be the key factor restricting the Taihu water environmental protection. Therefore, we built the game model between major stakeholders. And we would like to check the behaviors of stakeholders, which affecting the promoting of Taihu Lake Basin, to analyze the effects of the rules of the game behavior in the Taihu Lake Basin water environmental protection. The action, strategy, payment, results and equilibrium in the game of main stakeholders were also analyzed here.Research shows that main factors led the game between central government and local government are the implementation of government monitoring costs, penalties and preferential policies. The probability of local governments to implement governance is negatively correlated with the central government’s regulatory costs and positively correlated with the punishment of the central government, local governments and local environmental protection departments of the game, the environmental protection department is actively implementing depending on the environmental protection department to actively implement the cost and the provincial government to the environmental protection departments to actively implement the praise and negative execution of punishment. The main factors causing the game between government and business are the governmental regulatory costs and penalties, enterprises’income and benefits got from positive governance. The probability of enterprises’active governance has a positive correlation with central government’s regulatory costs, and a negative correlation with punishment of government. The game between the central government and the collusion of local government and business is negatively related with the punishment from the central government to the local government and enterprises, and increasing the punishment to the collusion of local government and business will put an end to their collusive behavior in pollution control. The game between enterprises and the public is mainly affected by the public participation costs and expected benefits, in addition, for the business are the benefits obtained by governing, the loss of reputation and governmental punishment for governing. Probability of public participation is simply related with their costs, total earnings and the economic benefits got from the enterprises.Combined with the game analysis and the actual situation of Taihu Lake Basin, we discusses the factors of influence to promote the protection of water environment inTaihu Lake Basin, and for the interest subjects in Taihu Lake Basin, we put forward the suggestions for constructing the Taihu Lake Basin water environment protection coordination mechanism. The result shows that the central government can improve supervision and management policies and incentive compensation system to mobilize the enthusiasm of the local government control of the basin water environment; governmental departments can through coexistence of constraint and incentive measures guide behavior of enterprises, enhance the enterprise’s environmental management level and supporting system can increase the public supervision to avoid the government failure and market failure.The game theory study provides new ideas which can enrich and improve the stakeholders in the Taihu Lake Basin water environmental protection cognition of game behavior, equilibrium the government to improve various stakeholders in the governance of Taihu Lake Basin Water Environmental protection and control of the relationship and effectively for environmental management provides a theoretical basis and practical guidance.