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Research On The Game Of Interests Among Environmental Protection Activities

Posted on:2006-07-06Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:L FanFull Text:PDF
GTID:2121360155472303Subject:Environmental Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Regarding environmental protection as a kind of social activity and economic behavior, from a case study of fishery pollution, this paper aims at the Interests among Environmental Protection Activities (IEPA), and attempts to explain the complexity of environmental problem and the root of low efficiency in environmental protection from a new angle of view, and a viewpoint that founding fair and efficient environmental protection institution is promoted in order to apply scientific reference to fishery pollution. In this paper, Game Theory and Stakeholder Theory are employed to analyse varied conflicts in environmental protection activities, from which a systematic analytical framework for IEPA is fabricated. A case study of fishery pollution in Changshouhu Lake is carried out in the framework, which comes out 6 game models, such as Tragedy of Commons, supervise game, principal-agent model, dynamic game of incomplete information, finitely repeated games and Herding effect, to explain the interest conflicts among the governments, fishery enterprise and fisherfolk. A conclusion that the unbalance of IEPA is the sticking point of low efficiency, and construction of efficient institution should base on interest adjustment is drawn out. This paper suggests that legal lever, economic lever, administrative lever, and public supervisal, such as founding an Environment-fair regulation, increasing the fine to lawbreakers, establishing reasonable interest compensating mechanism, and reforming the merit system, should be employed in the adjustment of IEPA. Considering the particularity of fishery pollution, and basing on the "polluter takes charge principle", this paper innovatively proposes Environmental Risk-taking Institution as the complementarity of the active environmental management institution. On account of the immaturity of environment & resources value accounting methods, the researches involved in stakeholders and the game of IEPA is a new direction. Due to the difficulties in quantitative analysis of IEPA, farther study is in need in the future.
Keywords/Search Tags:Environmental Protection, Interests, Game Theory, Fishery
PDF Full Text Request
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