State - Owned Listed Company Executives Personal Characteristics, Corporate Governance And Over - Investment

Corporate investment is one of the three major financial decision-making behavior,which is the key to corporate profits, and which is decided to base the size of the interestsof shareholders.Therefore, the efficiency of corporate investment behavior is directlyrelated to the ability of the business to maximize value, but also the relationship betweenthe shareholders can receive maximum benefits.Based on economic activity in the"bounded rationality", we can see the manager’s decisions are not optimal, mainly due tothe complex and changing environment, and managers the ability to understand theenvironment and cognitive ability are limited. Also, because the prevalence of internalprincipal-agent problem, our investments can not be completely optimal, namely, theexistence of non-investment efficiency.Managers of listed companies as a corporate investment behavior makers andimplementers, the enterprise has a direct impact on investment behavior. This paper willexplore the managers of listed companies in China non-personal characteristics of theefficiency of corporate investment levels.This research mainly includes the following sixparts:First, proposed this research background, a brief study show that the theoretical andpractical significance, explained the need for this study. Then put forward the basic logic ofthis analysis framework and research methods. Finally, we illustrate this feature.Second，sort and review the relevant literature at home and abroad. Principal-agentproblem is accompanied by generation of a modern corporate system, prevalent in thecompany. The principal-agent problem is an important manifestation of the conflict theinterests of managers and shareholders, managers do not always act to maximizeshareholder value as a target, often exhibit behavior of individual self-interest of managersin the investment behavior on the performance of the non-investment efficiency. This is notonly due to the presence of principal-agent problem, and also based on informationasymmetry. Shareholders are not directly involved in the company’s management, betweenmanagers and shareholders, there is a serious information asymmetry, managers can easilylead to moral hazard. Thus, managers are closely related to behavior management and personal characteristics on the efficiency of corporate investment behavior ofnon-correlation.For this statistical data, select the manager’s age, education, gender,educational background and demographic characteristics of the five terms in order torepresent the manager’s personal characteristics. Domestic and international research showsthat managers of these demographic characteristics and level of business investment innon-efficiency-related, but different academic results are not consistent.Since the existence of principal-agent problem, shareholders in order to preventmanagers to grab personal gain, on the development of a series of corporate governancemechanisms to monitor and restrict the behavior of managers. This paper only analyzes thecompany’s internal governance mechanism, the mechanism of incentives and checks andbalances. Domestic and international research shows that corporate governance andbusiness efficiency level of investment is a non-related relationship.The third， analysisd the relationship between theoretical of managers personalcharacteristics, corporate governance and business and investment behavior, and then makethe hypothesis of this paper.The fourth, the hypothesis was studied on the basis of design. This paper make thehypothesis of this paper and define the model and measure the variables, the empiricalanalysis for the next preparation.The fifth,it will be analysised to test the foregoing theoretical assumptions.Finally, according to the above analysis come to the conclusion.The main features ofthis study is to examine not only the analysis of the characteristics of the individualmanagers of non-listed companies, the efficiency of investment behavior, but will alsoregulate corporate governance mechanisms as variables, to analyze the mechanism ofregulation of corporate governance under the personal characteristics and businessmanagers non-relationship between the efficiency of investment behavior.