The Nature Of The Enterprise Participating Banks, The Actual Controller And The Rental Cost Of The Credit Market

As China’s growing openness, a large number of investment opportunities have also spring up, financing needs of enterprises are increasing, but China’s capital markets underdeveloped, and therefore the bank loan is the main way of financing, to solve the financing difficulties.To obtaining privileged loan guarantees, duration and other aspects of the bank’s credit business, enterprises will usually carry lobbying to decision-making team, while paying the exorbitant "rent", this unproductive nature of rent-seeking activities in credit markets have brought corporate in financing costs soar. Domestic and foreign scholars study found that after taking a stake in Banks, enterprises can establish direct and long-term relations of cooperation with bank, argues greatly reduce the degree of the information asymmetry between bank and enterprises, by controlling the bank some financial resources to improve the financing efficiency purposes, but the enterprise take equity stakes in Banks can effectively reduce the transaction costs, their researches are not consistent with the conclusions.Cost of rent-seeking in credit markets is a kind of special transaction costs in credit transaction process, this article take enterprise of holding bank shares as the research object, find the relationship between holding bank shares and cost of rent-seeking in credit markets, and take the nature of controller into the model, research on the following three issues:first, the mechanism of enterprise holding bank shares impact cost of rent-seeking in credit markets; Second, the relationship between the proportion of enterprises holding bank shares and cost of rent-seeking in credit markets;Third, the relationship between the nature of the controller and cost of rent-seeking in credit markers. The issues of high real interest rates and resource allocation unefficiency are the key areas of the current financial reform field, this research has important reference value on how to reduce the cost of financing, prevent the corruption problem in the process of credit financing and financial marketization reform.At first, this paper summarizes the previous studies, the motivation of the rent-seeking behavior in the credit markets summarized as two aspects of internal and external factors, internal motivation is the imperfect bank management system, inadequate internal control and supervision, external motivation is the status quo of banking imperfect competition, capital market is not developed, and the government transfer payment mechanism of nonperforming loans,that are decided by economic and financial policy; Then analyzed that the equity investment enterprises for bank how to influence credit business decisions, combined with the approval process of shareholders as the borrower of loan set by the CBRC bank, to build an analytical framework based on principal-agent theory, analyzes the mechanism of enterprise holding bank shares impact cost of rent-seeking in credit markets:the enterprise take equity stakes in Banks can inhibit the production of rent-seeking behavior in the credit markets, under the condition that the external market, policy, environment are not changing, credit market of rent-seeking behavior are controlled from the source, embodied in the bank shareholders as borrowers, the certainly symmetric information between shareholder and managers, and had an adverse effect to the bank managers setteing rent and the pursuit of self-interest maximization behavior, solved the rent-seeking behavior in the credit markets that due to the internal principal-agent relationship, reduce the costs of rent-seeking in credit markets significantly; we has carried on the empirical research based on 597 Chinese listed companies from 2009 to 2012,that holding bank shares,it is found, first, for the rent-seeking activities of enterprises in the credit markets, taking equity stakes in banks to increase their control of financial resources is a kind of effective mechanism to reduce the cost of rent-seeking, second, the higher proportion of equity stakes in banks enterprises take, the lower cost of rent-seeking in the credit field, lower cost of rent-seeking has improved enterprise’s financing efficiency, the third, actual controller property take a significant effect on this relationship, the average of proportion of equity stakes in banks of state-owned enterprises taking is higher than that of private enterprises, their cost of rent-seeking in the credit field is significantly lower than private enterprises. We have put forward the corresponding policy recommendations on how to reduce the cost of rent-seeking in credit markets that controlled by different nature controller.