The Analysis Of Government Hold Up The Privite Problem In The PPP Project

PPP (Public-Private Partnership) is called public-private partnership mode, which means a long-term partnership between the government and private investors to provide a product or service to the public. With China’s economic development, the contradiction between a large number of infrastructure and public service needs and the limited financial capacity, the introduction of social capital in the field of infrastructure and public services has become an effective way to solve this problem. As early as in the last century 80’s, private capital participate in the infrastructure construction of our country through BOT.With the new government came to power, in order to deal with local government debt crisis and downward pressure on the economy increase. Efforts to promote the government of PPP will continue to increase, despite the government’s active, private capital is very hesitant, while the government hold-up problem is one of the important reasons of the hesitant of private capital.Based on the analysis of previous studies, the article first combs the theoretical knowledge of PPP model and the hold up problem. Then analysis the mechanism of government hold up problem in PPP projects from the PPP asset specificity, contract incomplete and government’s opportunism behavior. On the basis of the foregoing analysis, using the dynamic game theory, construction game mode between the government and private investors in PPP projects, discuss the government chose, different equilibrium path of private investors effort and social benefits. Through the analysis,we will be more clear understanding the formation mechanism of government hold-up problem in PPP project, and the analysis results provide corresponding countermeasures for solve the hold-up problems. In the background of the state to promote the PPP model, studying in view of the hold-up problems existing in the PPP project is of significance.