The Strategies Selection Of WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism And The Performance Analysis In Trade Remedy Measures

Based on the four-stage game model of WTO dispute settlement, this paper mainlyanalyzes the dispute cases accepted by WTO during1995-2012and dispute settlementstrategies selection at every stage game. We find that there exist significant differencesamong the following four stages: consultation stage, panel stage, appellate stage andimplement stage. The complainants tend to the strategies that requesting the establishmentof a panel and being decided by the panel. while the respondents are very likely toappeal and choose the strategy of charring out the WTO Appellate Body decision in themajority dispute settle cases.The paper also find that the main dispute parties are almostfrom developed countries, especially USA and EU, who have different individualstrategies selection. Moreover, the strategy choices at every stage of different disputeparties vary with different economic development levels. Besides, the average durations atevery stages of WTO dispute settlement under different strategy choices are calculated.Furthermore, considering the various durations of different WTO dispute settlementcases and the difficulty to quantize the multi-stage strategy choices, the paper firstlyestablish an unbalanced dynamic panel data model to empirical analyze the efficiency ofWTO’s DSB when dealing with trade remedy measures disputes as anti-dumping,countervailing and safeguard measures. The results indicates that it is possible forimporters to compensate trade loss to some extent by turn to WTO dispute settlementmechanism when suffering new measures, especially, disputes resolving, requestingtermination of the panel’s work, mutual satisfied settlement and implement of WTOresolution play significant roles in promoting trade flow. However, the longer the processof WTO dispute settlement lasts, the more harmful to the liberalization of those twocountries.